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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: The Role of the IMO in the Maritime Governance of
Terrorism
Degree: MSc
The objective of this study is to identify the role of the IMO within the international 
actions against global terrorism after the attacks of September 11 2001, in the USA. The 
essential and relevant elements of terrorism are observed within academic definitions in 
order to examine how they affect policies and strategies that guide a response against it. 
The impacts of terrorist attacks on society are appreciated in their influence on trade and 
all aspects. The constituency of the response is analyzed in search for the principles that 
may give an approach that is not simply limited to the issuance of regulations and 
measures but to the integration of a maritime policy and strategy to protect shipping. 
Two case studies are looked into in order to identify the causes as to why shipping has 
not had protection in past situations of crisis. The solution to terrorism in the maritime 
sphere of influence is explored under the principles of reform of the United Nations, the 
legitimacy of the IMO as the maritime forum, the concept of Global Governance 
towards Maritime Governance, and the theory of complexity. The change proposed is 
significant; therefore, core issues of the identity of IMO and its overall role have been 
briefly visited in order to provide for its new approach against terrorism. The role of the 
IMO is then built on its previous structure and the new components of a future enriching 
and vigorous role for the protection of shipping. Conclusions, recommendations and a 
guide for further research are presented.
Keywords: IMO, Role, Maritime Governance, Terrorism, Global Governance, All
Inclusiveness, Policy, Decision Making, Complexity Theory, Scenario.
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PREFACE
Dissertations usually do not have prefaces but some of the findings of this research have 
brought profound reflections. They were of a humane nature different to the purpose of 
this study. They have been so deep that I would like to share them with the reader 
through these pages.
In the process of searching for ways to implement the concept of Global Governance to 
eventually achieve the protection of shipping, I came across the concept of all 
inclusiveness, the inclusion of every institution and every individual in managing all our 
common affairs. It spoke about being able to participate in the decisions of ones interests, 
which for whatever reasons were not duly being considered by the actual representative 
system of governments. This seemed a mere ideal and unable to be put into practice.
Then followed many other concepts such as the reasons for terrorism and why is 
shipping defenseless or difficult to be protected against the violence of war and piracy 
attacks. How it seemed that shipping was being excluded from the right to have 
protection. The theory of complexity spoke about fit ecosystems that survived because 
the more species they included, the higher was their chance of survival. The theories of 
organizational structure showed how organizations needed to include diversity into their 
ways, ideas, and people in order to survive. Scenario principles indicated that scenarios, 
which excluded options, were not representative of governance systems and that by 
excluding interests they were closer to conflict than to the cooperation achieved by 
including all interests. At this point I discovered that inclusion and exclusion were key 
words that associated many of societies wonders and conflicts.
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In this way I found that all inclusiveness was absolutely practicable. It called for all 
institutions and individuals to exercise their participation and responsibility in the 
decision and policy building against terrorism and to be included in the discussions at 
high levels. It called for the discussion of issues of essence to be included at all 
institutional levels and that these issues were not the exclusivity of one body that would 
decide on how to protect shipping. To have exclusivity was to exclude.
I also found out that Life is about the diversity of all people, that diversity is about 
inclusion and that terrorism is about exclusion - a sad and maybe avoidable exclusion. 
The less we include is the more we exclude and the system that could be our world will 
not be fit to survive.
Maybe the words of Olof Palme, on Common Security, speak about mutually including 
each other and of this “presumably impracticable” all inclusiveness, when he says, 
“They (the belligerents) must achieve security not against the adversary but together 
with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than 
on a threat of mutual destruction. ” If one of the adversaries does not wish to survive 
then something is seriously wrong.
May all our minds, bear the remembrance of the seafarers that have lost their lives in 
conflicts because they could not be protected, while keeping the lifeblood of trade 
flowing for the world to continue its progress; and, very specially, in the cases where 
Maritime Governance, of which each individual is a part of, was not there for them.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
GLOBAL TERRORISM AND MARITIME GOVERNANCE 
PREPARING FOR UNCERTAINTY WITH A NEW CONCEPT
The attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon in the United States of 
America (USA) on September 11, 2001, have changed many aspects of international 
relations. The global future of the world has been affected in ways that are difficult to 
predict, in political life, commercial life and even daily life. In this future, the maritime 
world is not exempted. How will these attacks affect the maritime world? Will there be 
attacks on ships or ports? How can we prepare for terrorism? These are questions that 
are being faced at all levels of the maritime community.
The concept of globalization has facilitated, by its nature of opeimess, the exports of 
violence from one country to another. In the same way as the world’s economies have 
crossed the old concept of borders, the violence of terrorism has crossed the old concept 
of focalized action, in one geographic location. Internal local conflicts have increased 
remarkably in number and are now not only expanding regionally but also globally. 
Thus, terrorism has become one more element of globalization. The WTC incidents are 
the evidence.
The problem of global terrorism in the maritime world has many levels to be given 
attention. The levels range from the lowest prevention measures to be preformed by the 
watch of a ship to the concerns on how the maritime community can contribute to peace
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in the world. However, terrorism, unlike other forms of maritime violence, is unique in 
its characteristics and in the difficulty of developing protection measures against it. In 
addition, globalization increases the possibilities of incidents by its openness to trade 
and immigration. All these aspects contribute to create a very complex situation that 
needs to be addressed internationally at all levels, from policies to instrumental 
protection measures.
The past efforts of the world maritime community to obtain protection for shipping 
against violence in order to continue its task of international transport have been very 
intense. However, the results of these efforts have not been successful. Shipping has 
been, and still is, hit by violence resulting in extremely serious and costly consequences. 
One example to illustrate this was the Tanker War during the period 1984-1988 in which 
the ships that were providing such a large percentage of oil to the world bn the route 
between the Persian Gulf and the great centers of consumption were severely attacked 
(more than 365 hits) by both contenders. The shipping community could not find 
protection, as will be-seen further in the study. Another more recent example is the issue 
of piracy that is inflicting §erious losses and still today cannot be contained. In spite of 
agreements, conventions, intergovernmental decisions and the intense activity of the 
industry, no clear and significant results indicate a decreasing trend. Who should protect 
shipping? Why is the protection of shipping by governments difficult at times? These 
questions lead us to the issue of governance of maritime matters in order to search for a 
way to govern the situation of terrorism, its problems and difficulties.
1.1 Are shipping interests represented in International Organizations?
Who represents international shipping interests? The answer to this question may be 
found in the role of shipping interests in maritime governance. The issue of how
2
shipping is represented within national governments and Non Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) lies in the International Governmental Organizations (IGO). 
Entities such as transnational and multinational enterprises have fragmented 
representation in national governments. Their global representation is not adequate to 
protect their interests in situations of world violence. These entities can be small or large 
but they represent a sector of world society that brings benefits to the world as a whole 
and who caimot be represented by the national governments beyond the interests of 
national jurisdiction. Their interests are beyond national governments. Shipping is one of 
these entities that due to its globalized nature, finds difficulties in having its identity 
represented in full by the partial representation of national governments.
Shipping’s interests are not fully represented in one forum but are fragmented in several 
fora. National interests, today, represent only a portion of the world’s interests. The 
situations that affect many nations are dealt with in international fora such as the United 
Nations (UN); however, the UN is increasingly inviting the participation of civil society 
to deal with all issues. The world has progressed from the post second world war 
concepts that created the United Nations in 1945. Today, the world is organized in states 
that, in many cases, consolidated their individual identities through the economies of 
peace, but, there also exists many organizations that are independent and beyond 
governments since they have interests in two or more countries. Some of these 
organizations are represented in international fora by NGOs. The interests that exceed 
national interests are still not represented totally in international fora, and much less 
efficiently networked, but are fragmented in different places and interests. One of these 
entities, that does not have full representation of all its interests and much less in one 
forum, is shipping. The difficulty to protect international shipping against violence is 
evidence of the lack of representation within the international fora.
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The societies of the world and the UN have successfully started to make the integration 
of economies, as well as the integration of peoples across national borders and across all 
other cultural borders, imaginable. This integration has been called globalization. The 
sea and shipping have always been globalized and, through the trend of globalization, 
are showing their relevance in an ever more important way. One of the potential 
capacities of globalization is the contribution to reduce conflicts among nations. The 
interests expressed as inter-national give an idea of between nations, whereas, interests 
within globalization refers to the concept of integrating everything towards common 
interests that affect all nations. This, in essence, not only involves nations but also all 
globalized entities that are not fully included within the responsibility of national 
governments. The sea, with its concept of common heritage in the United Nations Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), is one of the first examples of declared world common interests 
that can also be seen as a common good. Shipping inherits from the sea the 
characteristics of a common good and this may be seen in the essential service that 
maritime trade performs for society by transporting more than 90% of world trade 
volume.
Shipping, being historically a truly globalized activity, is immediately affected by the 
conflicts of nations in one part of the world producing impacts in other nations in other 
parts of the world. To which country can the benefits of shipping be attributed to? The 
identity of world shipping exceeds one single coimtry. Does a country, which is 
benefiting from the oil trade or the trade to and from Asia, have the responsibility or 
rights to the common good that is world trade? If it were so it would have the right to 
uninterrupted trade routes, and maritime violence would hamper it. Do all societies have 
a right to demand protection and stability of world trade when focalized conflicts affect 
them? Will governments react to protect flags that are not their own? The answers to 
these questions may require a previous detailed analysis, however, the threat that 
terrorism poses on all these questions is very real and simple to perceive. In the light of
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globalization, the threat of terrorism to shipping is a risk to the prosperity of all societies, 
national and international.
A practical insight into the problem of the protection of shipping from terrorism may be 
found in how governments and the international civil society govern the response to 
terrorist incidents affecting the maritime community. If we interpret governance as the 
managing of common affairs by all actors, the idea of governance of maritime security 
against terrorism would include not only governments but the whole of the world’s civil 
society. This would imply responsibilities to governments and different responsibilities 
to the civil society that need to be networked towards the end goal that is the protection 
of the maritime community. In order to deal with the effects produced by terrorist 
incidents inflicted on the maritime community, a way must be fotind to include the 
unique international identity of shipping that is beyond governments, into a mechanism 
of Governance that will provide protection to shipping. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) should play an important role in the networking of these 
responsibilities and in representing the international identity of shipping.
1.2 The UN vision of the 21®‘ Century through Global Governance and a new 
approach for the International Maritime Organization against Terrorism
The UN has entered the 2U‘ century with extensive plans for reforms (reforms at the UN, 
2002) that include its main bodies and also reach far into all its agencies. The 
Millennium Assembly of the UN, 55*'’ session on 5 September 2000 (the General Debate) 
and the Millennium Summit for world leaders (Millennium Summit), dealt also with 
these reform matters. The concerns for governance of world affairs and governance of 
the UN have had a central role in the millennium meetings. Of all the documents 
concerning UN reform and world governance {Millennium documents and others}, the
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UN Commission of Global Governance (UNCGG) has a central role in the vision of the 
UN 2U' Century reform of the governance of -world issues and UN participation. Two 
core documents state this direction of change: “Our Global Neighborhood”, (1995), and 
“The Millennium Year and the Reform Process - a contribution from the Commission on 
Global Governance to the Millennium Summit”, (1999). These initiatives show how the 
UN sees governance within the process of globalization.
Globalization poses many challenges to world communities and to the functioning of ^ 
governments as true representatives of these global interests. As globalization changes,, 
shipping changes and becomes even more inter-national than it has ever been before. ■, 
One example is the extensive use of international registries. All these challenges of 
change in structures are at the same time “challenged” by terrorism with the element of 
uncertainty and the threat to hinder future development. The- concept of Global 
Governance (GG) developed by the United Nation’s Commission on Global Governance 
gives an answer to the problem.
It is important to make a distinction between the concepts of Government and Global 
Governance. Government, in this study, refers to the structure of people, activities, 
methods and principles in which administrative and political units manage the interests 
of countries. Global Governance is referred to as it is conceived by the UNCGG (1995), 
by “The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs”. GG is a concept that approaches the idea of governance in a more 
comprehensive way by including all the actors and interests in an all-inclusive way. This 
characteristic of all inclusiveness is the key ingredient that provides the means for all the 
component parts of society to take part in the governance of their common affairs. The 
openness of the concept goes beyond the traditional concept of political government by - 
recognizing the participation of other institutions and individuals that have their role in 
managing matters that are relevant to society. In a time when governments are
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downsizing, other organizations are performing functions that before were governmental. 
Moreover, new functions or needs are coming into play as society develops. The 
influence of technology is an example of the fast needs for adapting new concepts of 
governance to the activities of individuals and institutions. To develop the recent 
concepts of GG is a challenge that is new to all fields.
I Maritime matters, from ocean governance to minor regulations, ^e a field of exceptional 
global characteristics for the furtherance of the mentioned reforms underway within the 
UN bodies and its agencies. In particular, the special international nature of globalized 
shipping makes Maritime Governance (MG) a favourable environment to test GG. The 
actual golbalized problem of terrorism that is of high priority is a good objective for MG 
since terrorism requires the cooperation of all sectors of society. To apply the concept of 
GG in an initiative to govern the situation of terrorism is a new approach towards 
^ maritime security and the role of the IMO.
1.3 The focus of this study
This study focuses on the role of the IMO in the joint action of national governments 
and civil society worldwide against global terrorism. The role is aimed at Maritime 
Governance developing the appropriate structure and functions of goveniance for the 
protection of maritime trade. In this defense, national governments play a highly 
significant role that cannot be delegated, inasmuch as NGOs are increasingly playing a 
role in maritime affairs and that is now challenged with a new role in terrorism. 
Furthermore, the uniqueness and unprecedented experience of a situation of world 
terrorism may bring into play actors with very diverse interests that the actual 
governance systems do not account for. In this governance scenario, the IMO has 
initially concentrated, as if by gravity, the greater number of interests of the maritime
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world in its forum, thus becoming the representative arena in maritime matters. This is a 
further challenge for the IMO involving the responsibility towards the maritime 
community composed by the states, the NGOs and the future actors that a versatile 
modem organization will consider. What is the ROLE OF THE IMO in matters of 
governance of maritime affairs with respect to the issue of terrorism? This question is 
the core issue, which this study will explore.
1.4 The methodology
The approach to the Role of the IMO in the situation of terrorism has been from the 
point of view of governance. The guiding line of thought needed to be expressed on a 
working hypothesis so as to have it defined for referencing and contrasting the 
arguments. Its detail is as follows
Working Hypothesis: The constitution of the decision process of the IMO lies with the 
member states but has additional contributions from other sectors of the global society. 
The member states’ main concern is national government issues and this is confronted 
with the need to protect shipping without the distinction of flags. The previous situations 
that have demanded protection of shipping have been unsuccessful. The analysis of the 
reasons leads to a lack of representativeness within the UN to provide protection and a 
lack of governing capacity of the maritime sector to achieve this protection. Given that 
the issue of governance of world maritime affairs extends beyond the government 
perspective, the concept of Global Governance is the instrument used to explore the 
solutions to the problem of terrorism within Maritime Governance. The IMO emerges as 
the natural forum. The Role of the IMO in the Maritime Governance of Terrorism is 
explored here within this context.
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The characteristics of this research is that the subject of terrorism in the dimension of the 
WTC attacks is very recent and without a developed interpretation as to the 
consequences. Moreover, the focus on governance does not have many previous applied 
cases since Global Governance itself emanated from the recent UNCGG 1995 report. 
However significant the challenge to research may be in this matter, it is appealing and 
necessary to approach the problem from its very essence, which is governance within the 
21®‘ century. The methodological approach that has been followed has needed to build 
on the new concept of Maritime Governance by importing conclusions from other 
examples of violence into the working hypothesis, since terrorism has no precedents.
First the overall situation has been investigated and researched, dividing it into analysis 
elements and then grouping them into better instrumental research units. The analysis 
elements have been brainstormed within the groups and an overall development of ideas 
and their relationship has been developed. The lack of information and previous studies 
on the issues of maritime global terrorism and global governance has presented the need 
to use alternative methods of proof of concepts by parallelism with other issues of 
violence that are not terrorism. Another alternative method has been to define a certain 
condition and extrapolate in the desired direction with conclusions and examples of 
other types of violence and similar types of governance systems.
Two logic criteria have been used: a) means towards purpose (teleological criteria), b) 
cause and effect (causal criteria). The cause and effect criteria did not prove clarifying or 
logical in some situations as, for example, when objectives and role elements were 
concerned. It was necessary to have the whole picture before developing the concepts 
and searching and verifying them with examples (for example: the assumption that 
shipping is difficult to protect due to its identity that is beyond national interests). The 
“big picture” was then brought from its state of merely linked concepts into a flowing 
logic with the effort and objective of the maximum tightness possible in order to arrive
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at concrete conclusions and recommendations from an initial picture of uncertainty and 
lack of precedents.
Consequently, the brainstorm and theoretical groups were researched a second time and 
brought into chapters, for more empirical support of the logical line of thought, and 
developed, tentatively, in a practical way to provide a coimection between theory and 
practice. The benefits of a tangible image of what is the abstract concept of Maritime 
Governance were also desired; therefore, elements that were theoretical and did not have 
a direct effect on practice were minimized or not included. The contrast with real life 
helped to test the partial conclusions.
1.5 The contents
The contents analyze global terrorism and its implications on the maritime community to
identify the need for -govemance|/The precedents of maritime violence are seen with the 
participation of the IMO and the role governance played. Subsequently, the 
considerations of governance for building decision making mechanisms and governing 
the maritime response to terrorism are developed. The role of the IMO in the light of 
maritime governance is visited and finally conclusions and recommendations for the role 
of the IMO are presented.
The contents of the core of the work start in chapter II: “Global terrorism and the 
implications to maritime trade.” In this chapter the unique concept of global terrorism is 
explored with the intent to view it in international maritime terms. The threats of 
terrorism on the maritime sector and the general effects on shipping and ports are shown. 
A brief description of the economic consequences is presented. Finally, the chapter 
sketches the call for governance in the response against terrorism in maritime matters.
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Chapter III: “Precedents of Maritime Security, IMO participation and Structure of 
Governance” reaches out to the scarce precedents of maritime violence in order to 
extrapolate in the direction of global terrorism. Piracy is considered in order to draw 
lessons learned that will be applied further to terrorism. The precedents of International 
Law, conventions and UN participation through the IMO are seen from the basis of 
governance. Finally, the consideration of the transition from administration to 
governance for the IMO is looked into in order to view a functional basis for response 
building.
Chapter IV: “The response to future terrorism from the perspective of maritime 
governance”, uses the transition from administration to governance (previous chapter) to 
develop an integral paradigm shift where the administration of maritime terrorism 
prevention is integrated into the larger concept of the maritime governance of terrorism. 
Scenario methodology is tested, selected and developed sufficiently in order to bring 
reality into the difficulty of understanding the abstraction of governance with the 
practical objective to find a way to govern the response against terrorism, not only with 
measures but also fundamentally with policy making. The scenario is then interpreted 
and objectives for maritime governance are identified in the light of what is going to 
bring success to maritime governance through the IMO. Finally, the objectives of 
maritime governance are channeled and the role of IMO in maritime governance is 
found as a core element of success.
Chapter V: “The Role of the IMO in Maritime Governance” analyzes under the 
perspectives of purpose, position (relative to other institutions), functions and the 
environment as maritime and non-maritime related sectors. A practical approach to the 
role is viewed analyzing uncertainty in the policy level,and in the instrumentalTevel. The 
use of the theory of complexity is superficially applied to test the all inclusiveness 
against diversity. The role of IMO is viewed in the role of its parts where the traditional
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structure is complemented with new elements that are incorporated 'from previous 
conclusions.
Chapter VI: “Conclusions and Recommendations” summarizes the development and 
implementation of the role of the IMO in the Maritime Governance of Terrorism. 
Recommendations are given and subjects for further studies and research are referenced 
in appendix III.
The application of the new concepts of Global Governance to Maritime Governance is 
wide and exceeds the applications of governance methodologies to terrorism and can be 
used in all fields of maritime affairs. The particular nature of shipping and its difficulties 
to obtain protection in areas of conflict and violence speaks of the low priority that 
shipping has within national governments. However, the importance of trade is 
paramount for all sectors of society. The concept of including all sectors possible will 
tend towards a richer identity of shipping and maritime trade. Constant changes in 
shipping are taking place at the same time as changes in the UN and changes in the 
forms of violence. The opportunity of IMO to take one step forward towards a more 
versatile and representative system of maritime interests is presented as a paradox with 
terrorism. The protection against terrorism needs to include the largest number of 
participants for ideas, new solutions and ways; and subsequently take on a challenge that 
has great costs at stake. Shipping is ideally international and therefo.re, by nature, it suits 
the concept of Global Governance. The opportunity to change with the UN as we enter 
the 2U‘ Century is a dynamic way to approach the solutions to the problem of terrorism 
and will undoubtedly influence all other parts of maritime affairs contributing to general 
progress in the sector.
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CHAPTER II
GOVERNANCE: A MARITIME STRATEGY AGAINST TERRORISM
The events of September 11, at the WTC, have changed the characteristics of 
maritime terrorism not only in its manifestations but also in its consequences. Terrorism 
has become widely globalized geographically, diverse in its ways and unforeseeable in 
the effects. This has made prevision and preparedness tasks difficult to dimension and 
proactive-ness unclear due to the uncertainty. An analysis of terrorism will be 
developed in this chapter with a focus on the actions of prevention and reaction needed 
to face it.
This chapter explores the concept of governance as a strategy against maritime 
terrorism. Terrorism is defined in an academic sense in order to identify the main 
elements that will affect maritime trade and the decision-making processes. The threat 
of terrorism on the maritime sector is analyzed stressing the importance of the threat on 
the decision-making element. The effects that terrorism produces on ships and ports 
give a real life image that makes evident the high risks of flaws in the decision making 
process. The economic consequences give a view of the connection with extra maritime 
sectors that will be affected. Then, considerations for strategy building against terrorism 
are looked into. The characteristics of terrorism, the threats on the maritime sector, the 
maritime and non-maritime consequences and the strategy building considerations lead 
to governance as the primary need in a strategy against terrorism.
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2.1 Terrorism: exploring the concept and its uniqueness
Terrorism, in all its forais, has been condemned during the second half of the 20*'^ 
century where it has presented itself in various forms. To define terrorism has constantly 
been difficult as-seen in Schelling (1981), Britten (1987) and the aging project of a 
comprehensive unified international convention on terrorism, UN Resolutions A/54/110, 
A/55/158. The effects however, give us a clear image of what is interpreted as terrorism 
in the form of acts of violence performed to induce fear. A definition of terrorism will 
give elements in the search for the difficulties and the sources of the problems to be 
addressed in a situation of terrorism in the maritime sector.
In an effort to reach an academic consensus, Schmid (1988) condensed a definition from 
a survey of 100 scholars resulting in the following statement:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) 
clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, 
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.* 
The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and 
serve as message generators) Threat-and-violence-based communication processes between 
terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main 
target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of 
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.
From this definition, there are four significant characteristics that represent the situation 
of active terrorism and that are useful for orientating the response. Each characteristic is 
expanded below in order to see the consequences of each term.
14
1. '‘Anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action”: Both anxiety and the 
repetition of violence produce tension and difficulty in the process of decision 
making. They inspire political precipitation and rushed decisions and responses. 
The repetition of violence will naturally produce increasing degrees of response. 
This is an escalation of the level of conflict in all aspects.
2. "(Semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors”: This implies two levels 
of action: a) activities of individual actors, b) activities under organized support. 
Individual actors will be involved in a local and focal conflict. When a state 
participates in supporting or producing terrorism it raises the conflict upto the 
international level. This can be enduring and resemble a situation of war.
3. "immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly ... or 
selectively” : There is no defined pattern; therefore, the defense against terrorism 
should consider all possibilities. This adds significantly to the complexity of 
building a response.
4. "manipulate the main target (audience(s)f': Through the target audiences all 
outcomes involve the public and the private civil society. Through the effects of 
the media audiences, violence will be transmitted. Then violence will not be able 
to be confined into war zones as it has been traditionally. The whole of society 
will be exposed to fear as in the WTC case. Since audiences are, in another 
concept, also the final destination for the “media”, the relationship between 
media and terrorism is high, thus contributing more to anxiety and to producing 
information confusion. An example is the denial of Reuters (2001 Sep, 2002 
April) and other agencies to use the term “terrorist” relating to the aphorism 
“One mans terrorist is another’s fireedom fighter.” Thomas and Standly (1988) 
discuss the issue expressed by the aphorism and the operational difficulties it 
presents and Tullock (2001) addresses the moral issue of the media’s use of the 
expression terrorist , where the impartiality and objectiveness of avoiding the
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use of the word terrorist may be questioned as diminishing the seriousness of its 
meaning.
In relation to these four characteristics and their implications, we can see that an 
international situation of terrorism and the response to it, will bring a state of anxiety, 
repeated violence, difficulty in making political decisions, complexity, pattem-less 
attacks, intense media participation, and confusion. The impact of this situation is highly 
relevant to globalization and any social activity that is essentially international, as is 
maritime transport. It is seen in the first characteristic that the social impact picture of 
terrorist incidents is not complete without the consequences of the response. Whatever 
the response to terrorism (however defined), it will impose preventive and defensive 
measures when not more violence in the form of the response. Thus, the complete 
picture of a situation of active terrorism is that of terrorist incidents with violence on one 
side and restrictions, controls and even retaliation on the other.
The response of the USA to the attack on the WTC (2001) has been the 
internationalization of the conflict on all fronts, military, economic, financial and social. 
The USA has been supported in the response by other nations because the attack on the 
WTC has been interpreted as a threat of global characteristics. The interpretation of state 
supported terrorism as mentioned before by Schmid is now a reality that motivated the 
coalition military actions in Afghanistan. The actions are against the state support that 
the government of this country provided to the terrorists involved in the WTC incident. 
This situation enlarges the risk of extending the conflict to other nations.
The crucial degree of importance of this situation for the maritime sector cannot be 
sufficiently stressed or insisted upon. As a previous example, the violence of the Tanker 
War, 1984-88, had severe economic consequences and maritime implications (Lloyd’s
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Shipping economist study, 1988) and is a sample of how situations of violence affect 
trade and maritime transport.
The characteristics mentioned show that a situation of terrorism includes the 
consequences of both opposing sides to the problem, not just the attacks. A need to 
define the threats is highly relevant. Theses two aspects: a) attack and response b) 
definition of the threat to the decision making process, are important factors for the 
development of the response of the maritime sector.
The consequences of terrorist incidents can be dealt with only from the response side 
leaving the uncertainty of the terrorist initiative as a factor that for the response is in 
principle out of reach. However, the governing of the response, its management and 
decision-making mechanism among states and other participants is fully within our 
domain. Any threat to this governance is very serious and with unforeseeable 
consequences.
2.2 The threats of terrorism on the Maritime Sector
It is beyond doubt that the threat of suicidal terrorist attacks on shipping and ports, as the 
core of the maritime sector, is open to numerous possibilities of uncertainty and difficult 
prevision. The analysis of these threats at a physical protection level is a technical matter 
as dealt with by many of the proposals submitted by the IMO member states at the 
meeting of the Maritime Security Working Group in February 2002. However, the 
threats of terrorism to the international maritime sector need to be set also in the policy 
perspective, or, simply said, in how to deal with it. The situation requires the treatment 
of terrorism on a multinational level and in close consensus with the other sectors of the 
global society. These conditions are of special relevance due to the international nature
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of maritime transport. The response will involve many tasks such as: deciding on a 
strategy, agreeing among nations, identifying what responses are needed and 
harmonizing them and avoiding excessive trade security barriers. These are all policy 
and decision making issues. In this way the maritime sector governs the response. This 
governing of the response involves issues of the governance of the maritime sector 
within international governance regimes. Governance is crucial in the situation of 
terrorism and is the starting point of physical protection measures; therefore, a threat to 
governance seems to renak highest in risk and priority.
The question that arises is: Who governs the maritime sector? Maritime governance lies 
in the scope of the meeting of all the sectors of global society that are involved in 
maritime affairs or affected by it. Very appropriate to this maritime issue is the concept 
of Global Governance (GG) expressed by the UNCGG, report 1995, as, "'the sum of the 
many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs”.
At this level, the threats that we may consider are the threats to governance, meaning 
that a threat to governance itself is a threat to the mechanism that produces the response. 
To illustrate this, some examples of failures at the governance and management levels 
will reveal the problems in responding to terrorism:
• Not being able to respond in time or adequately to the needs of the situation
• Piecemeal solutions to incidents without an overall perspective of Ihe socio­
economic factors involved in the consequences
• Legitimate isolated or local efforts that do not conform to a global policy of 
nations and may be conflictive between themselves
• An overkill response with negative effects on economic and social development
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The above threats and the concept of governance describe a situation where a lack of a 
harmonized, in time and adequate exercise of governance on a global scale produces 
unwanted management problems. The examples of the risk of unilateral, and possibly 
conflicting actions, are legitimate, however, to preserve the integrity of the maritime 
sector and, eventually. Society Itself consensus and harmonization of policies is the 
prime objective. Thus, it can be expressed that the principal threat of terrorism to the 
governance of the maritime sector is precisely ineffective management and governance 
expressed as: The threat of not being able to deal with the problem. The situation of 
terrorism and ill-governance will produce numerous effects that help us grasp the 
dimension of the consequences on shipping and ports.
2.3 The effects of terrorism on Shipping and Ports
The threats that terrorism presents to the maritime sector are materialized in the risks in 
targeting ships and ports. Furthermore, the whole economic logistic supply chain is 
affected and involved since containerized cargo is consolidated at origin and distributed 
at the final destination, demanding far greater measures of control than those that are 
strictly maritime (Coulter, 1998). According to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the two extremes of the chain (production and 
consumption) are also exposed to terrorist acts from threats consolidated within the 
cargo (OECD Outlook 2002). The risk of all the parts involved in sea transport shows 
the nature of the problem of threats including all the movement of cargo and persons.
The different degrees of intensity of terrorism will produce different degrees of 
constraints and reactive measures from the maritime sector and the governments. Some 
of these variable defensive measures and consequences are described below considering
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that their intensity of reaction will be according to the risk of events and possibility of 
future attacks. The references are from IMO working documents and various authors:
• Increased security for ships and ports (MSC 75/17/1 i.5, 2002)
• Increase of insurance - “War” and “Malicious acts insurance” clauses
• Increase of liability - liability of the shipowner for deficient security 
prevention measures resulting in a terrorist attack that could have been 
avoided
• Increased control of ownership of vessels (MSC 75/17/1 appendix. 4, 
2002)
• Increase general costs - training, equipment, operational requirements 
(MSC 75/17/1,2002)
• Increase of regulations, international and national (MSC 75/17/1,2002)
• Vulnerability of trade routes (Brooks, 1998) and increased costs by 
routing affecting business opportunities (Noer & Gregory, 1998)
• Increased government intervention on the logistic chain (Coulter, 1998) 
and in the traditionally free international maritime trade inter alia
Shipping operator activities
- Routing
- Personnel screening
- Financing 
Chartering practice 
Ownership of ships and cargo
- Documentation in general, ship, personnel and cargo
• Blacklisting : Blacklisting is a reactive resource that is in use in several 
port state control agreements for targeting sub standard vessels. Applied 
to anti-terrorist measures, it has a negative impact on trade as a whole.
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The concept of blacklisting might be used by different actors that do not 
have the capacity to respond to international anti-terrorist measures.
- Flag States
- Ship operators, port operators
- Port States or Ports themselves
- Multimodal chains
- Identified commercial companies
The impacts on shipping and ports can be very diverse according to the increasing 
threats due to new attacks or to the lack of preparedness and prevention. The failure to 
address the problem and develop the necessary awareness and preparedness may result 
in last minute impulsive overreactions that will impact severely on the industry and 
consequently on trade and economies.
It has become a common conclusion, over the years, of symposiums, workshops and 
seminars on maritime terrorism that the security costs fall on the industry. In different 
periods that were affected by violence at sea the conclusions are similar: expressions 
relating to the tanker war “the industry should be liable for failures to take reasonable 
security measures, open to substantial awards for damages to third parties, ... moral 
obligations to give adequate protection to passengers and crew”, (Parrit, and workshop 
decisions, 1986). In the same sense the impressions of the effects of the WTC attacks 
according Hiebert & Saywell (2002, Aug) express similar views: “Most analysts and 
shippers assume that participating ports [in container security controls] will be expected 
to purchase their own [security] equipment, and they will pass on the costs as surcharges. 
It is. also assumed that container [security] sensors will be paid for by shipping 
companies and charged to customers.” This consensus is clearly preparing the way for
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higher costs for the maritime sector that may be even higher, as seen earlier, in a 
scenario of inefficient governance.
2.4 The maritime economic consequences of terrorism
The general overall consequences of the terrorist attack on the WTC have been severe. 
The attacks on the WTC have had short-term impacts that were rapidly controlled 
through crisis management decisions and mechanisms; however, the overall losses were 
estimated at 5% of the GDP of the USA. The reaction was quickly approved by the US 
Congress on September 14 in a $40 billion emergency package and soon after by $5 
billion in direct grants and $10 bilhon in federal loans to US airlines (OECD Outlook 
2002). The effort to counteract the results of the attacks has been extremely significant. 
Would similar measures be enacted for shipping? From which government would the 
support come from: the coastal state or the flag state? Would the ships registered in 
international registries be supported financially for the losses? Can international 
registries aide their ships in terrorist incidents?
The impact on the insurance market has posed the question of the need for government 
action where private insurance will not provide cover. Just like other periods of violence 
at sea the initiative on behalf of the private sector has been to transfer responsibility to 
the governments for coverage that is not held. However, there is no clear view that 
governments will move towards this position in relevant amounts. The OECD Outlook 
2002 compares different government support initiatives as follows. In France, the 
“Caisse Centrale de Reasurrance” has moved up from covering catastrophes to cover 
terrorist consequences for a sum of €1.5 billion. In Canada there is no clear definition. In 
the UK a government-backed mutually owned company “Pool re,” initiated in 1993 after 
the Irish Republican Army bombings, is set for terrorist compensation where the first 
£100.000 lies with the primary company. In Spain, the “Consorcio de Compensacion de
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Seguros” deals with terrorist compensation mainly to solve incidents concerning the 
ETA Basque separatist movement. Overall it can be seen that these examples from 
different countries are clearly for a smaller dimension of liabilities and for incidents that 
are more local in nature with smaller consequences. These systems are clearly not 
prepared currently for an incident of the consequences of the WTC attacks. In maritime 
insurance the available systems will cover war risks but on specified terms therefore the 
characteristics of the situation will influence premiums, coverage and eventually the 
responses of governments will also be calculated, (Rooth, 2001). In maritime matters, 
will governments support the insurance policies of ships outside their own flag?
According to the OECD Outlook 2002, international trade will be affected by security 
measures in possible amounts between 1 and 3 per cent ad valorem. Considering that 
elasticity trade flows ad valorem range between -2 and -3 % this would mean that a 1 % 
increment in trade cost would have the effect of a decrease of 2-3% in trade flow. 
Maritime shipping costs increased 5-10% in the two weeks after the attack but returned 
to normal values afterwards. Beyond this period, shipping costs were not affected by the 
incidents and were stable during the six months after the attack. What would be the 
effect of repeated violence on the very elastic trade flows translated to shipping?
The extended federal loan^Ahat have covered the losses to promote reactivation, the 
increased costs of insurance and the impact of higher costs on international trade, all 
contribute to the recessive business cycles. The maritime sector has not reacted with 
increments of costs in the short term after the attack, possibly due to the competitiveness 
of the freights. However, it is possible, as seen above, that the effects of security 
measures will be reflected on the costs. This is a clear example where the response 
through regulations is increasing the costs that the attack did .not affect directly. It is also 
clear that preventive measures must be taken in order to minimize the possibilities of 
further incidents.
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2.5 Considerations in developing the approach or strategy against maritime 
terrorism
Due to the nature of terrorism and the consequences expressed above, the approach to 
the problem must necessarily be of wide scope, integral, and multidisciplinary (Carberry, 
1999). The focus must be on building capacities on the national, regional and 
international levels that will perform accordingly to the needs of possible incidents. The 
effort should not be exclusively put on measures, restrictions or controls but on 
developing the means and policies to develop them, tailored to the specific needs. The 
generalization of measures to all possible incidents is a simplistic solution that has high 
costs for trade, businesses and the end consumers. *
Two issues must always share the governance of the problem : the socio-economic and 
the security constraints. This duality should always be maintained in good health, so that 
the opposing interests are balanced. Failure to do so will produce uimecessary 
vulnerabilities or excessive militarization for protection. The understanding between the 
different international and national organizations should be put into action in a 
multidisciplinary approach and not in a compartmentalized manner. No one entity 
possesses the ability to produce such integration successfully.
Terrorism has evidenced itself as versatile and changing; therefore, the answer must be 
just as versatile and adaptive to that change as necessary (note the use of necessary and 
not the word possible, since possible is just not sufficient). The answer can lie in a 
regime for the interaction of Nations, International Organizations (10), between 
themselves and with NGOs to deliver responses that will not affect the free international 
nature of shipping. ^In this the United Nations plays a crucial role since it is through its
bodies that response is naturally being conducted in a unified international way. 
Examples of this are the preventive measures proposed at the IMO by different member 
states in the MSC 75/ISWG intersessional working group documents. The proposed 
measures deal with the instrumental aspects of the response.
If the actions are channeled through the UN, the specialized agencies will need to 
develop policies and act in the light of the UN Charter. This implies that the maritime 
sector requires representation at the UN. The international and liberal nature of shipping 
has been globalized in character long before the word globalization started being used as 
it is used today. Shipping provides an excellent example of the true essence of 
globalization. All other transportation or trade activities have not experienced such a 
high degree of internationalization. It is in this way that the maritime sector has much to 
contribute in its response against terrorism and its risks to globalized trade, not only with 
the instrumental measures to protect trade but with its views, opinions, policies and 
strategies in the Global Governance of the terrorist situation dealt within the UN.
The IMO is the only agency that uses the sea operationally and in a sense as a vital 
component for trade. The severe effect of terrorism on world trade, and consequently on 
the development of nations, has already been mentioned (OECD Outlook 2002). The 
IMO is in a unique position to voice policies and strategies at a higher level than 
measures and participate in the intensive conceptual decision making of the global 
response to terrorism at the UN. The impact on the airline industry after the WTC attack 
required substantial extra funding. A similar impact on the shipping and port industries 
will have impacts that are unpredictable for the sector as well as for the whole of the 
world economy. An example could be an incident that might close the port of Los 
Angeles, concentrator of the main trade flows froin Hong Kong, Shanghai and 
Singapore, and consequently producing a repercussion on international trade (Hiebert & 
Saywell, 2002).
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The common good of peaceful trade that globalized economies are achieving is helping 
in the prevention of war and violence. The disruption of peace impacts negatively with 
recession and hinders progress, as has been the experience during two World Wars. This 
common good is becoming a common asset that belongs to humanity rather than to 
individual nations. The UN system has strived for this common good since its creation. 
In globalized economies, international trade is an important engine that promotes the 
coming together of nations. The key element of the system of international trade is 
maritime transport that cannot be considered in any other way than through the 
international dimension.
Thus, it is important that such a key element as maritime transport participates in the 
decision-making processes of a response to terrorism at the UN or through the UN 
specialized agency for this matter, i.e. the IMO. It would not be wise to repeat the 
experience of the minor role played by the shipping industry in the discussions of the 
UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as expressed by Gold (1989) and the 
consequences of not addressing the relevant shipping issues as pointed out by Huebert 
(1998).
The conceptual approach expressed above can be based on the following considerations 
and that will contribute in administrating the degrees of implementation of measures that 
should be proportional to the threats:
• Assure the inclusiveness of the maritime sector with all participants needed as 
expressed in the concept of GG by UNCGG.
• Elaborate a proactive facilitator regime for timely terrorism response 
development and implementation.
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• Work towards a unified international response (Carberry, 1999) within the UN 
Charter
• Integral awareness in all the logistic supply chain (Coulter, 1998)
• Scenario vision for research, (Menefee, 1993)
• Regionalization - Its purpose is: the containment by geographic sectors, tailored 
solutions in the specific places needed, avoidance of overkill measures, overspill 
avoidance so that one conflict does not affect or involve parties that are not 
concerned, to avoid generalizing a local situation and to provide protection and 
continuance of trade in focal areas to minimize socio-economic impact. (Sea 
Power Conference 1998)
• The use of technology will facilitate and enhance knowledge and prevention. 
(US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1992)
2.6 Governance: a new maritime strategy or can it build on pre-existing 
structures
The approach and strategy towards the problem of maritime terrorism is an issue of 
governance where the capital aspect is the all inclusiveness of related sectors based on 
the concept that trade is a common globalized good. The effects of terrorism to trade are 
severe but so are, with differences, the restrictions imposed by the response. The threat 
of not being able to respond to the demands of governance in a situation of terrorism is 
the greatest threat. An objective of great importance is to maintain economic growth and 
development in spite of the situation of terrorism. The main objective should be the 
elimination of terrorism that can be pursued through the objectives of the UN Charter. 
The principle of all inclusiveness obliges the consideration of and the striving for these 
objectives at all levels of decisions and policies, with contributions and participation to 
higher levels of decision making at the UN. Failure to do so will dilute the strength of
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governance of security against terrorism and end up with the simple implementation of 
instrumental measures that only address the aspects of control hut not the aspects of 
governance.
The maritime consequences of terrorism are significant to the shipping sector being that 
the rise of costs will affect the already depressed profits. In addition, international trade 
and the globalization process that has brought countries closer in their economies and 
culture will be endangered with terrorism itself and possibly also with the restrictive 
measures used to control it.
A unified international approach is essential as it is important to avoid unilateralism in 
the way of allowing no need for its use by providing an adequate multilateral response. 
For this, a timely response-building mechanism must be available and the necessary 
International Organization or forum must have the decision-making capacity and 
procedures in place with pre-established policies to avoid internal conflicts of 
governance. This can be initiated by think-tank procedures where the use of previous 
experience and the existing structures are a starting point of the analysis.
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CHAPTER III
PRECEDENTS OF MARITIME SECURITY, IMO PARTICIPATION AND 
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE
The precedents of maritime security lie in the instrumental measures and legislations 
that have been put forward on each occasion when, violence at sea has erupted. However, 
in the past, the incidents of violence have been focalized in areas and have not^^ 
international interconnection as with WTC, 2001, incidents which were linked to the 
Middle East. This internationalization has found a natural forum in the discussion at the 
United Nations. The question of governance of the terrorism is merely underlying in the 
preventive measures against terrorist issues and not yet developed in full to express 
international policies and strategies to deal with the problem. Governance is slowly 
starting to be structured through the activation of conventions that, are finally being 
ratified and are entering into force, amendments to conventions and legislation, the 
meeting of intergovernmental and non-govemmental organizations and the confluence 
of these actions in UN agencies like the IMO that provide the meeting point of the 
interested parts, in a formal and direct way and in an informal and subjacent way. The 
international structure available and in use is the basis for the needed all inclusiveness. 
This structure has already encountered violence with the WTC attacks.
3.1 Terrorism and Piracy: differences and the common sharing of violence
In the maritime field, terrorism has been present in two relevant cases: the Santa 
Maria,\96\ and the Achilles Laura, 1985. Both had political motives and both were
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passenger ships which were hijacked. The more recent cases of the Tenyu, 1998, 
Alondra Rainbow, 1999, and Global Mars, 2000, had their cargoes as objectives, no 
political motives and the characteristics of maritime armed robbery or its near figure, 
piracy. According to previous experiences the acts of terrorism in the maritime field 
have not been significant and much less had a pattern, therefore it can be said that the 
experience of such incidents is scarce.
The maritime sector, however, does have extended experience in piracy as a form of 
violence at sea with the rising number of incidents and of greater degree of violence 
Statistics from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) report 2001, indicate 
continuous rise of up to 469 incidents (2000) with the exception of a decline to 33 
incidents (2001). The trend in increase is still present, in spite of the decrease in the ye£ 
2001, and with the relevant difference that incidents have become notably more violent.
Reporting centers for statistics and warnings to mariners have been set up and the 
subject of piracy has been discussed in many fora. The information on piracy has 
become extensive and its characteristics well known, but the similarity with terrorism is
motives, risks at stake, commitments, means and final goals are different. Piracy pursues 
private interests and is generally not associated with destruction but with violence, 
detention or depredation committed for private interests (UNCLOS 1982, art 101).
This common ingredient of violence presents a signal of caution to the maritime | 
community in the question as to whether the response to piracy has been effective and if \
the ships have been protected, and as a consequence, if the lessons learned are useful for 
the issue of terrorism. The results of the IMB and the IMO reporting systems clearly 
state the continuance of the issue of piracy. The Singapore II - 2001 Conference of the 
Comite Maritime International (CMI) on “Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and
\
scarce and lies only in that both share the common ingredient of violence at sea. The
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other Maritime Violence”, addresses one of the most important oBstacles to the 
contention and eradication of piracy being the lack of national legislation in areas 
affected and their harmonization (this would be either a regional or even an international 
issue). This is a lesson learned which is applicable to terrorism: national legislation is a 
high priority and harmonization with all affected and non-affected countries is 
indispensable.
Regionalization of actions against piracy has not been sufficiently effective and the 
statistics have shown that success has not been reached. One & Two track Diplomacies 
(formal & informal) have been extensively used in producing numerous meetings of 
interested parts at all levels. The official initiatives have come in the form of conferences 
such as: March 2000 International Conference of All Maritime Related Concerns, both 
government and private, on combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships; 
October 2000: Mumbai ARF Intersessional maritime meeting with the focus on piracy; 
and, the 2001 Tokyo conference by the Nippon Foundation. Informal initiatives have 
also been held and have helped the coming together of different components of different 
countries, but the results on the incidents have not been significantly positive.
The UN, through the meeting of UNICPOLOS ( UN Informal Open-ended Consultative 
Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea), New York 2001, as an informal open-ended 
forum concentrated on two main concerns: 1) whether there was adequate action at 
regional level to ensure co-ordination and co-operation among relevant authorities and 
law enforcement agencies; 2, how the United Nations could assist States in enacting the 
necessary legislation so that offenders are punished; and in the establishment of law 
enforcement capabilities (UNICPOL 2001).
In the report of the May 2001, the UNICPOLOS commission clearly stated “the lack of 
communication and cooperation ainong the various national agencies involved” (item
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254). Furthennore the initiative of the IMO 1998 anti-piracy project concerning 
reporting, information and cooperation “had not coincided with any significant 
improvement of the situation; on the contrary, the situation had worsened”, 
(UNICPOLOS, 2001, item 249). It is appreciated that the efforts of coordination and 
cooperation have not been fully integrated in all aspects and that the addressed elements 
of the problem has been mainly on instrumental measures; however, one important 
aspect reflected in UNICPOLOS 2001 is that the concept of all inclusiveness is clearly 
present as an essential element, even though it is not expressly mentioned but dispersed 
in all its extent. The document shows by its exposition that a variety of organizations 
have been concentrated and brought to the scene on the issue of piracy with a variety of 
initiatives, and that the future is also in that direction.
A significant mention is registered at the UNICPOLOS meeting of 2001 (item 298) 
concerning the development of a regime,
...after encouraging cooperation between States and relevant international bodies, 
several delegations pointed to the need for a global management regime, as well as to 
the need to ensure that measures taken by individual States were consistently enforced 
within the framework of international law. World Bank, together with regional bodies 
and States, should support those measures, it was suggested.
The mention of a management regime is precisely oriented - towards a concept of 
governance and it is noticeable that this concept of governance is being applied to the 
issue of piracy and violence at sea. This use of governance is rather innovative since 
governance is most commonly used for governing concerted interests in the utilization 
of resources, such as the cases of ocean governance (Valencia, 2001) and not to face 
violence. In the document, management is not referred to as a control regime, 
surveillance regime, contention regime, counter-piracy regime, or any other 
denomination of numerous types of regimes. The report states the concerns of the
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delegations as encompassing all the actions imaginable and necessary to deal with the 
issue of violence in piracy by using the expression of ''global management regime" for 
managing the problem. Management is a term for. business or organizational science. 
This concept applied to world politics and security is referred to as governance.
It stands that piracy, in the form of an encounter of the maritime community with 
violence, has been a precedent to the issue of globalized terrorism in maritime matters. 
The applicable international experience that has come out of it and its conclusions are a 
contribution as the following lessons learned with the issue of piracy that should be 
considered in the light of terrorism:
I. National and International legislation is a high priority and the harmonization with 
all affected and non-affected countries is indispensable
II. All Inclusiveness is a key ingredient
III. One & Two Track Diplomacies (formal and informal diplomacies) are useful in 
reaching the broader scope of all inclusiveness 
rV. There is a need and a demand for a Global Governance Regime
3.2 Terrorism, International Law and the United Nations
International Law has had an atomized approach towards terrorism. Different countries 
have varying legislations that present differences in the response. International 
conventions on terrorism are specific instruments that address point form issues lacking 
the necessary comprehensiveness of the integral issue that is terrorism. For this matter 
the UN Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/158, 2001, gives specific instructions for the Ad 
Hoc Committee on International Terrorism to develop a comprehensive convention 
addressing terrorism. This initiative is also based on the concern that among these
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conventions there is a lack of harmonization and existing differences in their approaches 
towards enforcement (Carberry, 1999). Most of these conventions have been developed 
under the auspices of the UN and other international organizations'. India has presented 
to the UN a working draft of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism that 
is still being considered by the Committee and other member states.
Cousineau (1999), of the Canadian delegation, expressed very clearly the essence of the 
issue of terrorism at the 54 UN Assembly and his views on the issue of the Indian 
proposed draft:
The proposal for a comprehensive convention on terrorism presents challenges and 
risks for the international community. We appreciate the efforts of the delegation of 
India to present a draft global convention which appears to avoid the sensitive 
question of the definition of terrorism and other politicized matters,... However, we 
should ensure that the consideration of the proposal for a global convention remains 
focused in its scope and avoids broad definitional questions.
One of the core issues is the difficulty of an approach to acts supported by or committed 
on behalf of governments. These concepts are clearly difficulties for the intent of 
internationally legislating terrorism. With this conditioning political factor in mind the 
international community, not only the UN, has set out to approach terrorism in a 
compartmentalized way. The international community is a much larger and wholesome 
concept than the UN alone since it carries the all inclusiveness of the individuals of 
society that through different ways want to prevent terrorism and confine it to 
criminalization without the prejudice of discrimination in the judgment of the motives. 
“Focused in its scope” would mean that the centre of action would be on the effects of 
terrorism. The understatement is that the conjunction of efforts on these effects will 
build a framework that will ultimately address, through the consequences, the issue of
‘ For further detail see appendix I
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terrorism. The procedures must be detoured around the definition, which implies the 
origins of motives, in order to avoid a political stalemate filled with the conflict of 
values that at this moment cannot be handled.
The legal address towards terrorism in maritime related incidents is mainly contained in / 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation - (SUA), (Rome 1988 - IMO depository) through the identification of the 
offences typical to acts of violence of which terrorism-is .one of its sources. The 
definition of terrorism is absent and the motives for the offences are minimized in the 
methodology. This convention is of particular interest due to its maritime characteristics ^ 
derived from the Achilles Lauro terrorist incident in October 1985 and its process of j 
development. As mentioned by Treves (1990) the remarkably short period between the 
preparation of the first draft and the opening for signature was approximately one year. 
This was possible due to the visible interests of nations, and in another sense, the 
particular consensus procedures of the IMO. This timeframe can be considered as short 
legal timing; however, it may not be sufficiently short to deal with real time measures 
that repeated incidents demand. This would call for a framework that would pre-agree 
measures before they were put into force.
For the IMO, the prestige of technical expertise, and the continuously proven 
methodology of unanimous decision making, are invaluable elements to deploy the 
concept of all inclusiveness. With these qualities, IMO is the most relevant forum to 
build the mosaic of measures for maritime terrorism that will become the regime 
towards governance in avoidance of unmanageable politicized elements. For this the 
legislation needs to be preventive by generating the governance mechanisms. How can 
legislation be preventive or proactive? It must exist before the birth of the event that is
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its object. How can it then be pre-existent? That is a key question to be answered 
through the IMO’s networking capacities.
3.3 Preventive action and the International Maritime Organization
The IMO, as mentioned earlier, has been the focal point where the preventive maritime 
response to the WTC attacks, that had no incident of maritime violence, was 
concentrated. This has been due to the recognition of the Organization’s representative 
capacity of 162 member states, including the-great majority of the nations of the world 
and the international shipping nations. Moreover, it is the principal intergovernmental 
body for maritime issues and where the majority of the maritime conventions are dealt 
with. Today, it is beyond doubt that it is at the IMO where the governance of maritime 
matters has its meeting point.
In addition to the structure of the SUA convention, numerous member states presented 
proposals (MSC 75/ISWG/INF) for the “Prevention and Suppression of Acts of 
Terrorism against Shipping” in February 2002, and which are to be approved in 
December 2002. These measures mainly address the identification and control of ships, 
cargo and people through different equipment and information systems and the 
development of a security awareness culture^. The measures finally drafted for the 
diplomatic conference that will adopt them as an amendment to previous conventions, 
mainly originate in the proposals presented by the USA, which is a considerable 
expansion and updating of a previous IMO document (MSC/Circ. 443, 1986).
Here a word of caution is to be given in the light of the preventive response that has 
mainly one source in the USA. The USA is a legitimate source, more than justifiable to
^ For further details see'hppendix II
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be so, since it is the' physical victim of the terrorist attacks that are signaling the 
beginning of a new international way of life. All states have interpreted this signal as a 
change in which they all are involved; however, the surprise of the events has left no 
time for research into the matter for the multilateral development of a strategy. The 
response cannot be considered unilateral due to its wide acceptance. This is evidenced in 
the converging opinions and efforts of the travaux preparatoires (MSC/ISWG/J/1) of 
the Maritime Safety Committee Inter-sessional working Group (MSC ISWG) that 
drafted the initial security measures proposal to the future December 2002 Diplomatic 
Conference. This work is the answer to the IMO Assembly Resolution A.924(22) (2001) 
that requests a revision on the maritime security of acts of terrorism, in order to follow 
the originator, UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1373 (2001).
The response proposed is predominantly instrumental, in the legal sense, mainly with the 
revision of the SUA Convention and it is instrumental in the technical sense with 
technological and procedural measures. This response still has much to do in order to 
develop the change in culture that has been signaled, however, the awareness 
development is the starting point without which the instrumental measures will have 
difficulty in being successful. This task is, by nature, an attribute of the IMO and justly 
confided to the IMO by all member states (MS) that have voiced proposals or opinions 
on proposals. This networking of MSs is the true preventive task. Inasmuch as 
prevention accounts for routine measures that stop terrorism firom occurring, the concept 
of pre-emption implies preparatory positive action towards the materialization of 
terrorism that is to be performed. Thus pre-emption leads to strategy and planning. In 
this way and even though both concepts of prevention and pre-emption are related, the 
concept of scenario-based decision making is best related to pre-emption or active 
strategic planning than to generalized preventive measures. In the initiative put forward 
by the MSC ISWG, the preventive view is extensively developed in routine security and 
information procedures while the preemptive policy and strategy is left to be developed
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by the IMO as stated in MSC 75AVP.18 APPENDIX 5 pg.4 “Further work of the MO 
pertaining to the enhancement of maritime security,” which carries the spirit of the 
implied commitment stated in the US proposal MSC 75/ISWG/5/7 art. 25, where 
maritime security is to be discussed as a high-priority long-term goal for the MO.
3.4 From a “Concept of Administration” towards a “Concept of Governance”
In the dimension of an international organization such as the MO, the administration of 
the interests of the member states with regard to shipping would lead to the regulatory 
development that has characterized most of its activity. In accordance wth this concept 
the organization was bom as the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(MCO). The Part II of the original convention stated: “The functions of the 
Organization shall be consultative and advisory.” MCO had also other functions to 
consider such as unfair practices in shipping as stated in art.Ib of Part I. The 
considerations that in 1948 would have been conflictive since MCO was an inter­
public-institution (inter-governmental) organization that might influence private matters 
today have become common practice, as is the example of the eradication of substandard 
vessels.
MO has evolved very much from this consultative function and the art. Ib Part I of the 
original convention mainly because shipping has evolved becoming more international 
and maintained its commercially free nature. Moreover, the simultaneous downsizing of 
governments and growth of multinational corporations that are beyond the frontiers of 
the sovereignty of states has also contributed in changing the MO. The complexity of 
the characteristics of the mixed nature, private-public, of MO extends its reach to a field 
that has always, since its creation, had these characteristics. This is even more so today 
with the flourishing of international registries as an example of this mixed nature and
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that are represented in its forum. The IMO has grown in the number of consultative 
members and also expanded in the ways it welcomes their participation. An example of 
this is the Classification Societies that today keep in their knowledge the authority of the 
technical developments which the member states, due to downsizing, have left to their 
trust. These issues present a question as to whether shipping today is an entity in itself, 
with interests in itself and independent of national governments. If the representation of 
member states at the IMO is a representation of member state shipping, where and how 
is shipping itself represented? Is this representation of shipping, such a traditionally free 
“adventure” - as referred to by past centuries jurists - a fair representation of the ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common [shipping] 
affairsl^ These are questions that are understandable but when inserted to the concept of 
the interaction of political states in the world, it may seem without solution and not 
worth attending. However, we may think that the lack of representation of shipping is 
without a solution, but this problem has had consequences as is the example of the 
process of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS) on which shipping 
expert Prof Edgar Gold (1989) comments.
During UNCLOS III shipping played a minor role, basically that of a polluting 
industry fighting defensively for an outdated status quo. Even the major maritime 
interests placed their fading shipping industries below resource and strategic interests.
During the 12 years that the deliberative process of the convention lasted, shipping was 
not sufficiently represented, and played a minor role. Nevertheless, shipping was one of 
the most heavily affected activities regulated by the convention. Shipping at UNCLOS 
was passively elusive by not participating intensely. Amother situation in which shipping 
did not want to be represented was at the International Maritime Conference at 
Washington, USA, in 1889 where it was announced that “for the present the
^ Applied Global Governance definition UNCGG
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establishment of a permanent International Maritime Commission is hot considered 
expedient.” At the Washington Conference shipping was actively elusive by negatively 
influencing the decision for the creation of an International Maritime Commission that 
might regulate it, as were the regulatory examples of the International Telegraphic 
Union and Postal Union that were created a few years earlier. This was the first 
precedent and also the first jeopardized intent to create the forerunner of the IMO, and 
that was influenced by the suspicion of attempting to control and restrict the freedom of 
shipping, (Focus on IMO, Sep. 1998). The need for agreements and regulation on certain 
issues concerning shipping abruptly became an urgent demand after the sinking of the 
Titanic in 1912, which triggered the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) of 1914. 
The elusive nature of international shipping, once again, continued to postpone the 
creation of any organization that might restrict or regulate shipping until 1948 when the 
IMCO Convention was signed. Furthermore, the convention was not enthusiastically 
ratified until 1958, being delayed for ten years for numerous reasons. The past elusive 
conduct of international shipping to avoid regulation, has contributed in the shifting of 
its identity from national to international. This transition of identity has producing a lack 
of representation within the international fora system of member states. This lack of 
representation will have serious consequences in conflict situations, as will be seen 
further in this study.
The question raised of who represents the international identity of shipping is also 
related to the desire of shipping to perform its activity with the least possible restrictions 
from governments and the greatest freedom of navigation obtainable. In this process the 
identity of shipping has progressively become diffused, of which clear examples are the 
multiple nationalities involved in today’s international registries and the complexities of 
identification of ownership of vessels. The commercial benefits of shipping obtained 
with a diffused national identity and an clear global identity are evident. However, in the 
presence of violence where the protection of shipping is required, the diffused national
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identity of shipping due to commercial practices has its drawbacks since nations are 
reluctant to defend an activity or interests that are not entirely under its jurisdiction.
The issue of the protection of shipping may be focused on how to introduce the concept 
of all inclusiveness, which will give shipping a representative stance into all maritime 
society’s interests groups. All inclusiveness, in this regard, is tied to the importance of 
trade to the development of nations and regions. Trade is a common affair of all states 
and by bringing its relevance towards the international identity of shipping, the need for 
the protection of shipping will become an interest to be defended by all nations. How is 
the representation of international sea trade brought to real terms when the interests are 
not nationalized in order to be represented in their true dimension by member states? 
These aspects may not have a precise answer today, but the direction towards 
governance obliges the all inclusiveness to be also all-participative. This concerns the 
idea of governance that the UNCGG brings forth as an element of future development in 
issues to be considered by member states and especially by other UN agencies. The 
protection of shipping is one of these issues.
The issue of security, of which terrorism is a part, draws closer the need for governance. 
Pugh (1994), in his concepts of “towards a maritime regime [in Maritime Security and 
Peacekeeping]”, states that “the IMO might be summed into a UN Maritime Agency 
which would have a range of security functions”, apart from its traditional functions. 
This is naturally an option to which the reasoning of the alternatives demands first an 
analysis of what needs to be done before deciding who is to do it. Thus it is necessary to 
view first, the development of a response to future maritime terrorism and afterwards 
who and how it will be governed.
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CHAPTER IV
A RESPONSE TO FUTURE TERRORISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
MARITIME GOVERNANCE
Global Governance as it has been drawn from the analysis of terrorism itself and the 
lessons of the precedents of maritime security, is the foundation for the successful 
response to future maritime terrorism. The analysis of the response from the governance 
point of view is centered on the process of policy development and conduct of maritime 
affairs as expressed by the definition of the UN Commission on Global Governance, 
(UNCGG), report 1995, as, “The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs". This analysis focuses on the process 
of governing the response and not on the assessment of the measures themselves. A two 
step analysis looks into the following sequence of logic in order to develop what will be 
called Maritime Governance (MG): first the situation is overviewed through a selection 
of scenarios for global terrorism, a selection of response scenario elements for maritime 
terrorism. This will give an image of reality to global maritime governance of terrorism 
in order to avoid an excessive abstraction of concepts and to bring the real problem into 
play. Then a specific scenario will be interpreted. Second, a concept of success for. 
governance will be approached with respect to the objectives of MG that will be 
established.
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4.1 Introductory concepts for governance within a scenario analysis approach 
and conflict description
A few introductory concepts will be presented regarding the importance of a maritime 
governance attitude instead of the governance of maritime issues. The 
compartmentalized differences of maritime safety and their usefulness for work at 
different levels are stated. Finally, the description of terrorism from a conflict 
perspective gives a more tangible view of conflict issues.
It may be noticed that from this point of the study onwards, the concept of governance of 
maritime terrorism, expressed before, will be changed to maritime governance of 
terrorism. The reason for this is to expose the reality of the indivisible nature of 
terrorism in MG, or any other specific governance, as will be clearly seen in the 
scenarios''. In addition, it is desirable to permanently visualize the natural insertion of the 
idea of MG into the world governance of terrorism in the ways of an integral world 
governing response. Seamlessness, an absolutely necessary quality for governing the 
issue of terrorism, is imbedded in Global Governance since it can only be obtained with 
the participation of lower levels of governance in the processes of the higher levels. The 
cost of minimizing it will be compartmentalization and the fallback into a routine of 
administration.
This difference may lead us to a question that may be clarifying: What are the benefits 
of viewing security also as an indivisible entity and not as maritime security? The 
attitude towards security is an incentive to pursue security beyond simply the ship, even 
the port and into the logistic supply chain as seen in chapter II. Maritime security, 
conceptually, is confined in some cases to the ship and in some cases to the port, and
By the use of scenarios and exposing real incidents the indivisibility of terrorism is seen in a simple way 
and supports the conceptual approach to terrorism of chapter II
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therefore, it is jurisdictionally tight in its own maritime discipline attributing success to 
its scope of action in its areas. Seamlessness with other securities is another matter to be 
achieved. For maritime institutions to pursue security as a integrated concept introduces 
the mandatory seamless connection with all the multidisciplinary fields. Seamlessness is 
imbedded in security itself; thus, the measure of success naturally implies an 
interdisciplinary effort. This detail of semantics may be irrelevant at first sight if the 
vision of terrorism or security is of instrumental measures because the scope of 
application is evident. The use of the term maritime security is clarifyingly convenient 
when it is referred to specific convention drafting and instrumental measures like 
SOLAS. However, when the vision is of governance, then policies, jurisdictions and 
legal concepts make a serious difference between the two terms. Thus, the preferred use 
of the terminology maritime governance of terrorism, involves policies of security and 
eventually of Peace as the ulterior objective of the UN Charter. At the level of 
governance it is the clearest and best way to visualize the scope of policies and decision 
making since maritime governance will automatically bring into play all aspects of 
governance that is not in terrorism itself but that does have a part in the integral response.
Before going into the scenario development process, the operational characteristics of 
the conflict that terrorism creates need to be addressed. In 1992, Schmid suggested to the 
UN Crime Branch a short definition of terrorism, complementary to his comprehensive 
academic definition, as; “Act of Terrorism is the Peacetime Equivalent of a War Crime”. 
The question that now arises is whether terrorism can be the manifestation of war in 
times of peacel War crimes imply a state of war, or in the undeclared case of terrorism, 
it would imply consequences that would resemble the manifestation of acts of war. As 
far a criminalization of the acts for legal purposes is concerned, it is clearly seen that the 
UN makes special efforts to include in the criminalization process all aspects that are 
related to terrorism as expressed in the Security Council resolution S/RES/1373 (2001) 
art. lb. To have^war crimes committed may seem to imply a general state or
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manifestation of war to a certain degree, at least in the form of consequences of violence. 
This would be the general scenario or “big picture”. The scenario approach will give an 
insight into the different degrees of this “big picture”. It is useful at this moment to recall 
the process that took place at the IMO during the year 2002 in order to respond to the 
WTC attacks of September 11, 2001 as was described previously in chapter III. Bearing 
in mind the time it took to elaborate the measures and the time it will take to accept them 
(time frames and measures detailed in appendix II, still not concluded at the time of this 
study), it can be appreciated how serious, if not paralyzing, the difficulties of 
governance can be for the IMO if the attacks are repeated acts of violence as Schmid 
(1983) defines terrorism or if a possible situation of war is considered (Schmid, 1992). 
These are the images that the scenario approach will describe in the light of terrorism as 
a conflict.
4.2 The scenarios of global terrorism: considerations for maritime governance
In the elaboration of seenarios, four approaches will be considered: the traditional High- 
Medium-Low level tension scenario approach, the Threat-Target or Hypothesis 
approach, the Consequence approach and the Subjective approach. The exploration of 
each scenario helps to imagine the possible situations that MG would face in different 
circumstances. The different approaches may be used separately or together, 
sequentially or in parallel, at will and as needed in order to represent the possible 
situations of terrorism, and also as required in the different levels of govemanee, 
operational or instrumental measures development. At all times, it must be remembered 
that a scenario approach is a tool that intends to represent reality thus helping to see the 
picture of the current and future situation of affairs. A reasonable quota of skepticism is 
a healthy ingredient that can prove very convenient since a representation is not reality. 
Returning in time to the days before the WTC attacks, and considering normal channels
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of information, few persons would have even considered the attacks even as a low 
possibility of occurrence of attacks on US soil, and much less if they considered the high 
degree of violence that was produced.
4.2.1. The High-Medium-Low level tension scenario approach
The High-Medium-Low level tension scenario approach is a traditional military 
approach towards conflict. An example of this approach is applied by Prins (2000) to the 
' concept of naval power within the UN. In this approach three situation scenarios are 
established corresponding to the three levels of tension that should be defined. Each 
scenario would specify certain characteristics applied to the situation that should not be 
only military but also concern impacts on ships, ports and trade. This approach applied 
to the maritime governance of terrorism would be:
SITUATION
/ TENSION
Military
Participation
Command and
Control
Mihtary Action* MG ISSUES *
LOW Presence National /
Alliance
Possible boardings, port and
ship controls
Harmonization,
raising awareness
MEDIUM Vigilance UN
procedures
Strict blockade, regional
confinement of the conflict.
Possible to regulate attacks.
Regionalization,
harmonization
HIGH Military action UN Command Strict blockade, boardings,
control, escorts of ships at
sea, main sea routes attacked,
interrupted or not in use
Interrupted areas of
sea transport,
difference in
measures between
areas
High-Medium-Low level tension scenario approach. The definition of tension can be subjective or done in 
real time according to the need. The columns with * have been added by the author to the original study 
by Prins (2000) with examples of military action and applied effects on Maritime Governance.
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This approach is a good example of the incidence of hard protective measures as 
militarization in order to enhance protection and prevention.
4.2.2. The Threat-Target or Hypothesis approach
The threat-target or hypothesis approach was used by Menefee (1993) in detailing 
possible incidents that could be inflicted on ports. This approach needs to be initiated 
sooner or later to have an idea of the acts that terrorism could perform. The incidents are 
described in time and place and type of attack in order to implement preventive 
measures. The ten scenarios presented by Menefee are an example of this approach:
1. All out global conflict
2. Regional conflicts
3. Civil war or separatist conflicts
4. Reprisal or other limited state actions
5. Transnational terrorism
6. National or sub-national terrorism
7. Isolated acts of terrorism
8. Group criminal acts
9. Isolated criminal acts
10. “non compos mentis” acts, (motiveless acts)
The WTC attacks most probably would not have been in the list before they were 
performed.
47
This is a very useful analysis since it shows the possible raw situations of the problem. 
The analysis from this point can further evolve in more encompassing pictures of 
situations, or interests-actors scenarios, and a process to center them on realities has 
started and continues. It is important to keep the scenarios in the broad scope not only to 
group the events but also to bring in the realities such as the consequences.
4.2.3. The Consequence approach
In the consequence approach, each scenario is expressed as an impact assessment. The 
focus of attention is the effects .or consequences irrespective of the cause or incident that 
produced it. This type of approach is frequently found in environmental scenario 
prevention or planning. The following is an example applied to the situation of terrorism:
• Paralysis of major hub ports such as Los Angeles, Singapore, Kobe, Hong Kong
• Reduction of international registries due to lack of protection by the Flag States.
• Incremental unilateral action due to lack of strategy of shipping as an 
international entity.
• Multilateral deliberation processes with the creation of block parties of opposing 
positions and views on decisions.
• International groups that do not find a way to express their concerns within the 
global structure of parliamentary debate.
4.2.4. The Subjective approach
The subjective approach exercises an outlook towards the situation in the perspective 
that is relevant or useful to the organization or originator. It can use the information of 
all the previous approaches partially, totally, selectively, or none at all and develop an
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atypical focus on the matter. This gives high flexibility to the process of creating the 
scenario and remarkable convenience in tailoring it to the specific needs of the situation, 
contingencies and desired objectives. It also has the advantage of a freeform format that 
makes it versatile to the change or adjustment of the agreed rules of scenario building, 
allowing for quick and easy, time and space modifications and with a greater 
independence of structure restrictions. Schwartz (1996) has expressed these concepts by 
projecting them towards experimented models with useful images.
The scenario process provides a context for thinking clearly about impossibly complex 
arrays of factors that affect any decision. It gives managers common languages for 
talking about these factors, starting with a series of “what-if’ stories, each with a 
different name. Then it encourages participants to think about each of them as if it had 
aheady come to pass. “What if our worst nightmare took place, and our primary 
business [Maritime Governance] became obsolete?” Or, “What if our most desired 
future [Safer seas and cleaner oceans] came to pass? What unexpected challenges would 
it present us?” Or, “What if a completely unexpected series of events changed the 
structure of our industry [Maritime Governance & Shipping]? Would we be 
overwhelmed, or would we see opportunities?
This paragraph of Schwartz’s is a notable illustration of the situation of Maritime 
Governance of Terrorism; naturally the additions in square brackets orientate explicitly 
the original quote towards the current day issues in the matter. This scenario approach 
helps to see and-focus on the difficult shape of Maritime Governance'that otherwise and 
for all practical purposes, would remain in the clouds of theories. The importance of 
theorizing is alive throughout the study and its objective is the transition towards the 
practicality and reality that Maritime Governance needs.
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4.3 Scenario interpretation
The scenario approaches of Maritime Governance have given a networking activation 
towards solving governance issues. However, these issues need to be brought towards 
the center of attention. The approaches have given some approximation to the problem 
of conflict and violence, even if on reading the militarization example (High-medium- 
low scenario) the natural tendency, or first impression, is to consider it far from reality 
or a remote option. Experience has shown that everything is to be included in the 
scenario building process. The WTC attacks in 2001 speak for themselves.
A most relevant speech addressed by the chairman of the International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), Mr. Papachristidis, gives a view of 
situations that are usually not considered but that have precedents in the past. A working 
luncheon in New York in 1988 for the Permanent Representatives of the UN Security 
Council was hosted by INTERTANKO, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) 
and The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) with regard to the “Tanker 
War” in which the continuing consequences on shipping had no visible end after four 
years of intense attacks on merchant shipping^. This speech was an interpretation of the 
many driving forces that were at play in the situation, not only concerning violence itself 
but how it impacts on the maritime sector that was affected by it and the actions or the 
absence, of them from the international organizations that represent the interests of this 
part of society. The speech, quoted in extracts of its most relevant parts, is an excellent 
example that helps understand in a better way the spirit of that moment lived by 
merchant shipping.
^ The war really started in 1981 with shipping incidents, however the main attacks to ships were from 1984 
onwards. ( Lloyds Shipping Economist Study- Conflict in the Gulf, 1988)
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Our intention, as you will no doubt have gathered, is to discuss with you the very grave 
continuing consequences of the Iran-Iraq conflict on merchant shipping. That you have 
taken time from your busy schedules to be here demonstrates that importance which 
responsible nations such as yours attach to this issue.
Needless to say, this problem is of the very highest priority to my colleagues at 
INTERTANKO, as it is to the members of BIMCO and the ICS. As organizations, we 
maintain a position of neutrality in the matter of the Iran-Iraq War. We come from many 
different countries with the world shipping community. But we are united by our maritime 
tradition, by our respect for peace, and by our fierce devotion to the ideal of freedom of the 
seas - an ideal fundamental to the international institutions, which you safeguard. We are 
also united in our deep concern over attacks on merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf and 
over the injury and loss of life of innocent seamen.
Since 1984, 365 vessels flying the flags of many different countries have been attacked. 
Their carrying capacity is 65 million tons. The material loss has been serious. However, it 
pales into insignificance before the human tragedy. Close to 250 mnocent seafarers from 
around the world have been killed and many more have been injured.
More importantly, shipping people believe that an interraption of waterborne trade out of 
the Gulf - for whatever reason and even for short a period of time- would have dramatic 
consequences on the price of oil through the generation of expectations, if not the direct 
impact on supply. We are confident you all share this view.
In the absence of multilateral initiative, certain countries have taken independent measures 
to protect their national fleets in the Gulf. However, as you know, the vast majority of 
shipping in the Gulf does not fly the flag of those countries that have a naval presence 
there. This is why the international shipping community is thankful for the recent 
declaration by the American Government of its preparedness to extend protection to 
neutral ships under attack in the Persian Gulf - if such protection is requested and if it can 
be given. However, the initiative if individual nations to protect merchant shipping does 
not in our view absolve the United Nations of its responsibility to defend the principles at 
stake - if not the ships themselves.
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And at the end of the day, to whom can we turn if not to the United Nations when it comes 
to ensuring that peace and international justice are respected. We count on your support in 
this vitally important mission.
The speech holds a large number of issues to be considered and that are best described 
by the original words. The following salient points are relevant to our study:
• A Clear description of the nature of international shipping referred to as “the 
world shipping community” since the qualification of inter-nation is not 
descriptive of the problem. There is no means for a “world community” to be 
represented; the world’s governance mechanisms have no previsions for it. 
Shipping is presenting its uniquely defenseless identity.
• The degree of unprotected vulnerability of world shipping is extremely high
• If the world community of shipping continues on the trade routes in these 
conditions it indicates that a withdrawal from the trade may be at least as 
inconvenient (in all meanings) as maintaining the routes. This exposes the no­
choice option situation for the carriers.
• The dangers to the stability of the world economy induced by oil price volatility.
• The absence of multilateral protection initiatives.
• No protection for ships whose flags have no fleets in the Gulf.
• No response from the UN after repeated requests of protection.
• US Naval forces were in the Gulf prior to 1988. The attack on the warship USS 
Stark, in mid 1987, by one of the belligerents precipitated the US support of 
world shipping. This event surely influenced the decision for protection 
expressed in the speech.
52
• This informal diplomacy of remarkably high level leaves no evidence of a formal 
institutional support.
• The continuous impression of lack of response is presented throughout the 
speech.
It may be of interest that the date of this speech, in which more protection for shipping 
was requested, was May 1988 and that the majority of literature related to the Tanker 
War is dated 1984-1988. A study of Lloyds Shipping Economist (April, 1988) has a 
clarifying comment.
In 1988, the ninth year of the [Gulf]® war, the conflict between Iran and Iraq was no closer 
to resolution than it had been at the start in 1980 - or in 1984, prior to the outbreak of the 
first tanker war. For all, but the maritime community^, the situation was, if not exactly quiet, 
at least back to “normal.” But such an analysis is both deceptive and deadly, for the Gulf 
has moved further away from peace and, with the intervention of outside powers, the 
situation has become immeasurably more complex.
Thus, as expressed by Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, the general reports and even history 
books en the war in 1988, but the maritime community continued in its search for 
protection after the 1988 end of hostilities. Such is the place of merchant shipping in the 
world’s knowledge, worries or priorities; it as much as a common expression within the 
sector:” the world takes for granted the fact that shipping will do its task.” A question to 
be further explored is, how can the reality, complexity and importance of shipping reach 
the higher levels of decision making in world affairs?
In this situation the maritime community is trying to search for a body of governance 
that will represent its international nature that is evidently not represented by the
® Square brackets added for clarity.
’  Italics inserted for clarity, not in the original.
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individual governments. This is a clear example of the lack of representation that is 
solved by an all-inclusive Maritime Governance. In this situation, who represents the 
shipping community? The MO is the only organization where maritime matters are 
dealt with in full. Is there a role for MO in this context? Is the way that INTERTANKO, 
ICS, and BMCO pursued protection and peace a reasonable way, or does it show a gap 
or flaw in the international system? These questions and many more are key questions 
that shipping needs to have answered in a terrorism crisis.
Without scenarios there is no vision of the possible future, and sometimes even of the 
present. The cadre de situation shown in the speech exposes very clearly the identity of 
international shipping, unique and essential to world economy, seeking ways for 
representativeness and the appeal for a possible forum within the UN to discuss the main 
issue. It must be noted at this point, that the idea or thought of the private shipping 
industry centered exclusively on economic profit interests is easily left with no argument 
with the clear thoughts and facts expressed by Papachristidis and the vital and dangerous 
roles played by merchant shipping during, not only the Tanker War, but previous wars 
and conflicts.
To give substance to the scenarios, an identification and analysis of objectives of 
Maritime Governance is needed.
4.4 Governance, its objectives and the interpretation of success
The clear reality of the scenarios shows that responses can be designed in many ways, 
but the success of governance of a unique situation of global terrorism must first be 
interpreted in the light of its objectives. These objectives must be agreed upon since they 
will clarify the working grounds of the global governance of the response. Success has 
two factors that influence it: the conceptual or theoretical and the executive or practical.
54
The authority and mentor of governance is the authority that emerges from the all 
inclusiveness of global governance. Therefore, the process of global governance assures 
success in the conceptual sense by the absurd, since the all-inclusive process does not 
leave out interests and thus avoids conflict that may arise by exclusion. In the process of 
transformation from concept into executive action, the degree in which global 
governance performs its objectives is the remaining factor of influence in measuring 
success.
4.5 Objectives of Global Maritime Governance
The objectives of global governance in maritime terrorism to be considered fall into two 
paths: first, the general governance objectives that are in the UNCGG definition of 
global governance itself applied to terrorism; and, second, the particular objectives for 
the governance of maritime terrorism originated in the previous analysis of the threat of 
maritime terrorism*, the considerations to the approach to terrorism and lessons learned 
from piracy. In addition to this, considerations of scholars will be included. 
Comparatively the Global Governance (GG) model is more comprehensive than the 
member state representation (MSR) model. GG incorporates a far larger spectrum of 
interests, groups and ways of balancing the interests; therefore the outcome is more 
representative of society. White (1991) expresses clearly the difference between global 
models and international models.
The distinction is significant. Internationalism assumes a cluster of nation-states, each 
with its own interests, and examines how they relate to each other. A global 
perspective begins with the globe as a socio-technological system. It focuses on the
® Previous analysis results in chapter II 
^ Previous analysis results in chapter II 
Previous analysis results in chapter III
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variety of linkages throughout the system, many of them policy issues that spill across 
national boundaries.
White further argues that the global concept looks into “how these linkages create 
problems for the global system and explores what mechanisms can be created to deal 
more adequately with the problems, and what further linkages can be crafted”. In this 
light, the objectives of the linkages that create the problems are likely to be different to 
the ones that deal with the problems. It could also be argued that the inclusion of many 
groups and interests is impossible to manage through an MSR system. Moreover, that it 
is through the national governments that all interests are represented and that, this is the 
reason why most inter-governmental organizations IGOs are MSR based. However, it 
has been exposed in this study that the rapidly increasing number of NGOs and their 
participation in the MSR systems, is the result of them being needed (for the reasons 
mentioned earlier) and because they represent sectors that are not representable by 
member states. Thus, a question is evident; does the MSR system truly represent the 
maritime world? This question is addressed in chapter V, in view of the relevant and 
valuable role of MSR as an essential element in obtaining the balance and all 
inclusiveness of Maritime Governance. A look into a group of proposed objectives for 
Maritime Governance will bring a more tangible image of the concept. Analyzing the 
objectives together with the interpretation of success, or how they ftmctionally develop 
towards success, provides a practical view of GG.
The General objectives for the Maritime Governance of terrorism and their interpretation 
of success derive from the UNCGG definition of Global Governance:
“27ie sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs”
56
Success is interpreted by the degree in which the objectives are achieved and, applying 
White’s (1991) concepts, by how they are interlinked further:
4.5.1 Inclusion and representation (I&R) of all the interests to the maritime affairs of 
terrorism.
Inclusion is the core of GG. So much so, that it states specifically '"public and private”. 
This instance has already begun and it can be seen, for example, through the numerous 
consultative members of the IMO. In regional maritime organizations there are also 
NGOs of private origin. Further still, in some maritime administrations there are services 
and consultant support that is also private. Their representation is more than consultative 
as is an example of the papers that have been presented at MSG 75 by these members. 
Their formal representation is not fully clear since their informal participation is much 
more intense. The mention of “individuals and institutions” in the UNCGG definition is 
a concept that is not fully exploited. Institutions are in full in the I&R concept, however, 
individuals have no presence but through their national government or some private 
institution to which they can associate themselves to. This concept has much more 
potential than is apparent. The word “interests,” that is not in the original, is a 
convenient redundancy. It is clearly implied in the expression “common affairs”. Its 
inclusion would present the idea of interests in an explicit way. This objective allows for 
a greater admission of ideas and possible solutions that are not within the structure that 
is dealing with a problem. In the case of the Maritime Governance of Terrorism (MGT) 
the options needed are as many as possible due to the impredictable nature of the 
incidents.
4.5.2 To put to work all the diversified interests, in formal, informal and new ways 
through appropriate mechanisms of interaction of actors to develop the policies and the 
conduct of affairs.
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This objective is the engine that impulses I&R. The evidence of diversification of 
interests is recognizing the difficulty of the issue and putting it in the vanguard of 
problems. “The sum of the many ways” describes the formal and informal ways, 
acknowledged by Bailey & Daws, 1995 as the usual way IGOs work. In addition, the 
new ways to network I&R are the challenge of this objective. Applying this objective to 
terrorism may give an inter-linkage that is convenient.
4.5.2 To bring the interaction of 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 towards a culture of security and the 
establishment and implementation of instrumental measures.
According to the February 2002 proposals received at the ISWG of MSC at the IMO, 
there is a remarkable similarity in the essence of the proposals and informative papers 
presented by the member states. It has been common ground that the culture of security 
is a foundation and the instrumental measures are the elements of prevention. These two 
aspects are the final product of IGOs and the implementation will even extend outside 
their reach. This objective is the link between terrorism and the response. The 
achievement of the previous two objectives needs to be performed jointly with the 
culture of security.
The following Particular Objectives of the Maritime Govemaiice of terrorism emerge 
from previous stages of the study that have been brought together.
4.5.4 Avoiding the principal threat to the Maritime Governance of Terrorism: "Not 
\
being able to deal with it. ”
As has been expressed in the scenarios, the degrees and types of violence are most 
varied and pattern less. Moreover, the fact that there is no experience in such a widely 
expanded conflict of these characteristics, and the uncertainty that it carries with it, 
poses a challenge^of unprecedented proportions to the IGOs and the governments
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themselves. The timeline of the maritime measures to the WTC attacks described in 
appendix II has been a fast track for conventions. However, fifteen months can be 
considered excessive to deal with an intensive scenario. The mechanisms of change in 
the process of objectives 1, 2 and 3 lead towards an adaptive governance (AG) according 
to the needs of the situation. How would MO and the maritime community deal with an 
intensive scenario? The difficulty in answering this question might suggest that it is a 
rhetoric question, but its evident reality is, today, far beyond doubt. The concepts of 
White expressed earlier may be the lead to an answer.
4.5.5 The Considerations to the approach to Terrorism
A unified international response as an umbrella regime and specific regional sub­
regimes with timely response to avoid the need for unilateralism.
The development of regimes that satisfy the global needs and, beneath, sub-regimes with 
harmonization under the global umbrella will give Global Maritime Governance the 
basis for approaching the diplomatic negotiations in a more consensual way. The 
inclusion of the largest number of possible interests will be supportive and contribute 
strongly to avoid the eventual need of some member for unilateral action. Global or 
multilateral action should always be preferred to unilateral procedures. The UN Charter 
(1945) directly specifies this umbrella concept in its articles.52 & 53.
4.5.6 The lessons learned from piracy
Out of the four lessons learned that emerge from piracy applicable to terrorism in 
Maritime Governance, two, all inclusiveness and the global governance regime, are 
already included in the concepts mentioned under Global Governance. The others. 
National and International Legislation and One & Two track Diplomacies are applied to 
terrorism as follows.
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The importance of enactment of national legislation is of high priority' in the case of 
piracy. It should be harmonized between nations to integrate regionalization, and further 
into the umbrella concept of objective 6. However, a more cautious step should be taken 
in the case of terrorism due to the lack of definitions on the subject and the very specific 
conventions that are already in force. The harmonization and assurance to be under the 
overall guidance of the UN is specifically mentioned by Arman (1995) in Supplement to 
an Agenda for Peace, in the following way “The primacy of the United Nations, as set 
out in the Charter, must be respected. In particular, regional organizations should not 
enter into arrangements that assume a level of United Nations support not yet submitted 
to or approved by its Member States. This is ah area where close and early consultation 
is of great importance.” Caution is especially convenient since the Comprehensive 
Convention on Terrorism is still in draft form after the resolution of the Assembly in 
2000 and 2001, and the previous draft presented by India, which initiated the matter 
(Indirectly the Global Governance Regime lesson of UNICPOLOS, 2001, also appears.)
One & Two Track Diplomacy (formal and informal diplomacies) are capital ingredients 
to produce the inclusion of persons or organizations that are not able to be included by 
the present structure. The preparation of informal agreements, if directed imder the 
consensus objective, fortify the development of the rules and norms that will be accepted 
and followed in a voluntary initiative that may or may not end in formal legislative 
obligation. The obligation of compliance in order to be included is the’ core strength of 
the consensus, which originates in the original will to include and be included. The 
effectiveness of governance is endangered by the exclusion of parts that would not make 
seamless any strategy towards the prevention of terrorism.
The considerations of scholars add different objectives that are useful to be considered, 
and which complement the previous objectives.
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4.5.7 The assurance that Comprehensive Security is really comprehensive.
The development of globalization and the IGOs has led to the evolution of the concept 
of security; and, in aftermath of the WTC incidents, terrorism will change it even further. 
A very clear view of this change and the approach is given by Mann Borghese, (1993).
The basic point that has been made is that security is not what it used to be. That is, it is no 
longer just military, political security: “Sectoral” security; but it must be comprehensive 
security. This fundamental change in our concept of security has far reaching implications, 
from the role of navies to the very heart of the United Nations system, the Security Council.
Comprehensive Security is at the core of the interpretation of the Maritime Governance 
of terrorism. It incorporates not only, the environmental factor as mentioned, but also the 
economic factor to include the operational concept of “sustainable security”.
4.5.8 The adequate moment, ways and degrees for the militarization of the conflict.
The use of military force in a conflict has many ingredients and considerations due to its 
complexity and lack of previous experiences of the use of sea power under UN 
Command. UN mandate forces are a different issue compared to the situation when the 
task is delegated to a national flagged force. The use' of iniiitary force has varying 
degrees of use, as expressed in the first scenario approach. It is clear that militarization 
should be the last resource. However, militarization has been an element used on many 
occasions, eg. the Tanker War, and therefore it should be considered. The main matter of 
concern is the problems expressed by Papachristidis (1988, ibid): difficulties for the 
representation of shipping due to its multifaceted identity, the lack of response from
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international organizations and the appropriateness or not of the Security Council as a 
forum for the matter. Thomas, 1998, comments on a possible approach:
In the event of a significant threat to maritime shipping on a large scale... Some form of 
international naval control of shipping would be required. The lessons of the Tanker War 
would apply and those states, the vital interests of which are threatened could be expected 
to cooperate in the protection of their maritime trade.
The example above shows the problems concerning international shipping and the 
diffused responsibility of the states. Some states do not have the means and the regional 
agreements are highly complex to coordinate, both politically and instrumentally, as has 
been seen with piracy in the South East Asia. Would the answer then be in the UN? 
Pugh (1994) comments on the UN as an answer to the problem.
The UN has considerable experience in peacekeeping, unequalled by regional organizations. 
However, its apparent weakness as an organization for deploying naval forces, especially in 
embargo and enforcement operations, may mean that it will have to delegate operational 
control to competent regional forces. But the UN should continue to be responsible for 
actions that it has authorized and contractors should be answerable to the UN.
The literature reviewed has opinions of criticism to the UN for not having a system to 
manage Naval Forces and the use of force by the UN. The responsibility is clearly there 
and supported by Annan’s Agenda for Peace (1992). However, the inability to control 
the military situation due to the absence of a structure adds more complexity to the 
already complex regional solution. Ginifer & Grove (1994) support this opinion in a 
more direct way by addressing the “lack of consideration that has been given to the 
question of naval management within the UN”. Furthermore, they state that “if the UN is 
to authorize maritime deployments more frequently it will no longer be able to ignore
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the naval management issue.” This explanation can be linked to the Papachnstidis (1988, 
ibid) request.
Security has proved to become wider in scope and means much more than just physical 
protection. Second generation operations, or operations other than war, are becoming 
front line priorities for the military since the threat of all out war is changing into a more 
intricate action against terrorism. To this the UN needs to conceptually resolve the 
management and control mechanisms of these forces that can contribute largely to 
maritime security in many ways other than war operations; otherwise, the interface of 
the military measures with economies and trade might most certainly endanger the 
concept of “sustainable security”.
The military also have their interests and while the contribution to security is very large 
the command relationship to the UN Security Council is of capital importance in order 
to focus on the objectives and avoid any possible shift of security, from being a mean to 
becoming an end in itself Brooks (1998) has a slightly different view of this.
Why should military interests be concerned about shipping? There are two overwhelming 
trends: global trade liberalization (creating even more transport routing options) and general 
military downsizing. Is it that the military is seeking a role given its own uncertain future in 
the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall? Or is.it that trade interests must continually be 
protected. The means to that lie more in PSC [Port State Control] efforts. The deployment 
of navies to secure shipping lanes is not driven by economics so much as it is by a country’s
political interests.
Be the locus of control, PSC or the routes, the contribution to peacekeeping of navies is 
relevant and a sure stabilizing force.
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To further the interests of navies and the will to participate, Greenwood & McLean 
(1998) have a simplistic view of the problem that up to now, in this study, has not 
proved to be such.
Perhaps the answers are more clear than we think. They may be as simple as the following.
Who should protect trade? - the government. Who should protect shipping? - the owners 
and investors. Who should assist them? - the government, but only insofar as its 
involvement represents protection of national rather than private interests. When should the 
government assist? - when it is important to warrant the risks and costs. How should the 
government do this? - they have a variety of instruments, one of them is the navy.
The complexity of the issue as has been stated in the many previous terrorism issues 
visited and the several opinions on the difficulties of governing security expressed in this 
study render this opinion dangerously simplistic. The aspects of: who should do what 
and why, is only the very start in analyzing the problem. It needs also to address the 
allowance of overlapping and grey areas where interdisciplinary, multifaceted 
approaches and joint participation are required. An example is the division between 
trade and shipping that cannot be drawn as simply as shown and specially when the roles 
of protection of one and the other are divided so distinctly between the government and 
owners or investors, two protectors with extremely different protection capacities. A 
much more serious position is the selective protection between national and private 
interests wheh it refers to shipping. -This difference and the previous ones are a 
destructive concept of the large efforts of internationalization of shipping and its 
contribution to global trade. It is surprising that this comment is made in 1998 when the 
private interests of trade are notoriously and directly linked to the prosperity of a nation 
as mentioned in many and different ways by the OECD Outlook reports (specially 2001 
after the WTC incidents). In this light we may consider Greenwood & McLean (1998) 
comments stated above as inapplicable and disruptive to Mann Borgese’s (1993) 
important concept of Comprehensive Security. The division of national and private 
interests may lead to repeat the problems of defenseless shipping in the Tanker War and
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the lack of results in the protection of ships against Piracy, as it is today a costly problem 
in lives and financially. The real solution for the 21®‘ century is far beyond the simple 
division of tasks and an inconvenient selection of shipping to protect.
4.6 Maritime Governance and the implementation of the response
The need for implementing the response to terrorism in circles of maritime interest has 
been expressed above as best achieved through Maritime Governance. The characteristic 
of the problem of terrorism is an opportimity to work towards the implementation of 
Maritime Governance.
The role of the IMO is an essential element in Maritime Governance since the IMO has, 
in some way been a meeting point of the diverse interests of the maritime community. 
An implementation of GG is an objective of the UN. The global characteristics of 
shipping and the demand that terrorism places on the decision bodies of IGOs and 
national governments themselves, presents a rich context in which to explore the 
implementation process. The initial point of implementation is the IMO as the generator 
of the maritime regime in formation. The role of the IMO in Maritime Governance will 
give a firm ground for the development of the full governance structure.
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CHAPTER V
THE ROLE OF THE IMO IN 
THE MARITME GOVERNANCE OF TERRORISM
Within the Maritime Governance of Terrorism (MGT), the role of the forum that is the 
IMO.is not synonymous to,Maritime Governance (MG).' The IMO is only a part of MG 
that requires the inclusion of other individuals and institutions to reach the activity of 
governance as has been appreciated in the preceding chapters. Thus, the IMO is a part of 
the Maritime Governance of Terrorism (MGT), and it is this role that is the focus of this 
chapter. Collateral issues to the Maritime Governance of terrorism are included when 
required for clarification of understanding. The Role of the IMO is expressed through 
the process of synthesis that is started in this chapter by integrating the identified parts of 
the previous chapters with existing elements of the IMO as it is today. This process of 
synthesis, of this study, ends with the summary, conclusions & recommendations in 
chapter VI. It is important to bear in mind that all references to “the Role of IMO”, 
represent the role that comes from the process of analysis and that tries in its utmost to 
be freed from'the influence of the present existing role of the IMO,'in order to obtain 
fresh and new perspectives. Even though initial impressions of the role may seem distant 
from the traditional present role, all aspects emerge from the supported analysis 
methodology, which also tries to bring the role close to the changes and reforms that the 
UN is implementing in the governance of its own affairs of interest.
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The concept of role, with reference to the IMO, will be viewed as ‘T/ze purpose, position 
and functions within an environment‘s. ” Thus, the purpose, position and functions of the 
IMO within the Maritime Governance of terrorism will be built with new concepts of 
previous chapters, with concepts from today’s IMO structure itself, and with additional 
concepts that arise from the integration process of the new and actual concepts. With 
respect to the environment, considerations for maritime affairs proper are given. 
However, also non-maritime considerations are 'brought up, in the light of shipping as 
such a relevant activity for world trade that all sectors international and national are 
directly or indirectly affected. The structure of the IMO as it is at present is blended with 
new concepts to arrive towards a role of the IMO Maritime Governance as needed. The 
comparison of this role of the MO and the traditional role at present of the Organization 
is not approached in full in this study, but it is used tangently only in details that will 
bring clarity to the Role itself The implementations of the aspects of the role that are 
new require further research to develop an implementation plan which is also not 
discussed in this study, in spite of having included some implementation measures that 
arise prima facie and that are important contributions to governance.
The Role of MO is approached first by looking at its conceptual component parts, 
second, a scenario analysis for the role of MO in MGT will be performed in order to 
bring the developed role into reality, and third, the derived new roles of MO’s structural 
components will provide a practical view of the organizational approach to MGT.
" The concept of role has been integrated from two linguistic perspectives: First, the semantics (meanings 
of words) of the word “role” (The Collins Cobuild Learner’s Dictionary and the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary), Second, the pragmatics (meanings and effects of words that come from the use of language in 
particular situations), as is the example of including the concept of environment that in the IMO 
interpretation of “role” is underlying in all the meanings and implications of the word. This concept of role 
also has the advantage of having an open end for further development.
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5.1 The Purpose component of the role of the IMO in the MGT
Six synthesized purposes integrate all the concepts from the previous analysis into the 
role of the IMO.
a) Inclusion and representation (I&R) of all the interests of the maritime affairs of 
terrorism to assure that Comprehensive Security is really comprehensive.
§
b) To put to work all the diversified interests, in formal, informal and new ways 
through appropriate mechanisms of interaction of actors to develop the policies 
and the conduct of affairs: One & Two track Diplomacies.
c) To bring this interaction of the previous two purposes (a&b) towards a culture of 
security and the establishment and implementation of instrumental measures.
d) A unified international response as an umbrella policy regime and specific 
regional sub-regimes with timely response to avoid the need for unilateralism 
National & International Legislation
e) - The adequate moment, ways and degrees for the Militarization of the conflict
f) To avoid the principal threat to Maritime Governance of terrorism: “Not being 
able to deal with it. "
The IMO Convention (original IMCO) presents in its art.l the purposes of the 
organization that are incorporated into the purpose element as follows:
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g) To provide machinery for cooperation of governments in international trade 
technical shipping matters.
h) To encourage removal of discriminatory action and uimecessary restrictions by 
Governments affecting shipping. To assure that encouragement and assistance to 
national flag shipping for purposes of security does not in itself constitute 
discrimination or restricts freedom of shipping of all flags. [Both aspects regard 
shipping in international trade and security can be interpreted as protection]
i) To consider unfair restrictive practices of shipping
j) To consider effects of shipping matters on the environment
k) To provide for information exchange between governments
These articulated purposes were developed in a post-war era where security was 
conceived under the bipolar cold war concept and the threats to security were interpreted 
as conflicts among nations. The role of security was assumed and overtaken by the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) under the UN Charter that was an outcome of World War II. 
Security in this sense fell predominantly on the military. The specialized agencies of the 
UN committed to their specialization and thus the roles were spontaneously assumed 
and the security role was left to the UNSC. In this sense security was not comprehensive 
nor did it include other types than security forces.
Today the concept of secmity has changed and some specialized agencies of the UN 
include the ulterior objective of peace and security in their basic Constitution, such as, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Being 
that IMO has highly specific objectives that are oriented towards the technical area, 
extended objectives are needed for the development of not only instrumental measures 
but also policies. These furthered objectives would lie in accordance with the agreement 
IMO-UN where provisions are made for closer understanding with the Security Council.
69
5.2 The Position component of the role of the IMO in the MGT
The position component addresses the nature of the relationships between the IMO and 
other organizations. It focuses on the dependent or independent hierarchical position of 
the IMO with respect to the other institutions.
The IMO Convention issues in art. 10 a concept of exclusion from the Organization to a 
member to whom a UN General Assembly Resolution is contrary to. This hierarchical 
conceptual relationship carries the concept of the blending of mutual objectives of both 
organizations as expressed in the agreement UN-IMO, 1948. This implies the committed 
concern of support and cooperation of IMO towards the objectives of the UN Charter 
and specifically the objectives of peace. However, the agreement UN-IMO in art.VI 
comes much closer to explicitness by giving IMO a clear mandate in “rendering 
assistance to the Security Council as the Council may request, including assistance in 
the carrying out decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security." Three significant concepts that emerge from this 
article of the agreement expose positions of due obligation between the organizations,
• The position towards civil society and shipping: The position of support to the 
UNSC is explicitly presented and with a hierarchy of dependency by the 
expression “as the Council may request”. This relationship is logically related to 
establish the clear overriding mandate of the UNSC, however, the contributions 
of specialized agencies to peace, as an ulterior objective is stated in art. 55 of the 
UN Charter “the creation of the conditions of stability and well being are 
necessary for peace.” The reference and relationship to the UN applies twofold 
to IMO since it is the only agency related to the stability and well being provided
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by shipping to international maritime trade and also the stability for trading 
demanded by shipping in the form of protection.
• The position towards the UNSC: The assistance to he rendered to the UNSC is 
wide in its expression, however it is specified in one particular aspect: decision 
making at UNSC level. This coincides absolutely with the independent analysis 
in chapter 4 indicating the importance of preparing for scenario decision making. 
In addition, art. IV.3 of the UN-MO agreement, 1948, indicates that the MO 
“affirms its intention in whatever further measure may be necessary to make co­
ordination of the policy and activities of specialized agencies and those of the 
United Nations fully effective.” Decision making in art. VI and policy making in 
art. IV of UNSC and UN level is a clear concept that states that MO has a 
position in the development of decisions and policies at that level. Thus 
furthering the reasoning, terrorism within the maritime sphere requires, policy 
contribution and decision contribution to the UNSC perspective. This requires a 
development of principles, priorities and actions of governance that come from a 
maritime level and lead to the higher UN level. This position of MO within the 
world decision-making system is far beyond instrumental measures and requires 
policy building, governance problems solving and future decision-making 
principles.
• The position towards Regional Regimes and National Governments: The 
mandate towards peace and security of the MO has an explicit position and is 
not inferred. The MO contributes to the higher instance that is the UN in relating
. directly to the regional and multilateral agreements. Once again articles IV & VI 
of the UN-MO agreement. 1948, come into the UN umbrella in policies and 
decisions that may need pre-emptive stoppage as requested by the pre-emptive 
legislative nature of art. 5 3 of the UN Charter. This concept is updated by Annan 
(1995) by extending the limiting nature of the enemy described as the enemy of 
the UN members to the amorphous threat of terrorism. This is a clear example of
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how the interpretation of the UN structure requires to be adaptive and updated to 
the situations of the 21 century.
The analysis of the position of IMO can also be viewed with respect to its own 
individual member states. Such is the case of the position of IMO with respect to the 
USA, in the subject of terrorism and in particular after the incidents of September 11, 
2001. The proposal measures of the USA in the IMO document MSC 75/ISWG/5/7 are 
the instrumental outcome of the national study of a national maritime response (art 2). 
These instrumental measures surely respond to a level of policy and strategy for decision 
making that, as an outcome, produced these.measures. The national study indicates to 
have considered “the elements of awareness, prevention, response and consequence 
management” within the USA and, thus, giving evidence of a higher level of planning. 
The networking of the forum that is the IMO on this issue, evidenced in the nature of the 
measures debated, has been instrumental and mainly supportive of the USA proposal 
with only one mention of an incipient policy in the reference to the need of long term 
goals. The USA national submission, nevertheless, states very clearly that this is not the 
end but the beginning of the response, in direct reference to the work expected of the 
IMO. This is an explicit call to policy development and governance aspects. Surely, an 
interaction at a policy level is of great importance in the light of the above UN-IMO 
1948 agreement articles IV & VI and also in the light of the responsibility to shipping 
with respect to_ elaborating and implementing policies and decision making mechanisms. 
These mechanisms would be convenient for the position of the IMO with respect to 
member states, such as the USA, in order to interface at a policy & decision making 
mechanisms level in order to fast track initiatives in a harmonized way.
The policy level position and relationship of the IMO with respect to the UNSC, to the 
MGT and to member states highly involved in terrorism, as the USA, is not supported by 
the technical orientation of safety to ships and pollution prevention traditional to the
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IMO. The networking of policies, strategies and decision-making mechanisms needs to 
be approached. The traditional technical position of MO within the maritime 
community served a regulatory purpose at a time when shipping required regulation. 
Today, in the aftermath of September 11 and with a future trend of global terrorism, 
shipping requires protection. It is to be noticed that the measures developed by the 
working group for MSC/75 on security measures against terrorism are still of a 
regulatory nature, whereas there are none of direct protective nature. The measures of 
direct protective nature require a different debate and approach. With this change of the 
demand for MO’s role by the maritime community and even by international trade, a 
new way to approach the problem as proposed is necessary. An important starting point 
to this new way is initially described in the first six purpose elements of the role of MO 
developed for MG above.
5.3 The Functions component of the role of the IMO in the MGT
The functions indicated in art. 2 of the MO Convention (1948) are as follows:
a) To consider and recommend upon matters in artl a,b,c (also mentioned in 
purpose elements) derived from various sources among which are the NGOs that 
are not in the original convention but have been incorporated due to reasons 
mentioned before.
b) To provide drafting capacity
c) To provide machinery for consultation among members and the exchange of 
information among Governments.
d) To perform functions connecting above paragraphs a,b,c, in particular those 
assigned by conventions.
e) To facilitate technical cooperation
73
These functions, with the exception of the first a), are administrative functions delegated 
to the Secretariat that do not relate to the Organization as the sum of member states 
functions. Function a) is an overall function, which is so general that it is left to 
interpretation. With regards to its application in situations of terrorism nothing is 
clarified by it.
A different perspective can be seen in the new functions of a networker, regime and 
policy builder, culture developer and facilitator. These functions when applied to MGT 
are very useful. These functions within the organization rest on the concept that “the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts” in the sense that the whole will promote these 
new functions that logically will not be promoted by the parts or the sum of them. This 
is due to the concept of the whole being a seamless unity where the sum of the parts still 
shows the fragmentation of a mosaic. The whole would have a perspective of identity 
that would assure comprehensive coherence that again cannot be provided by the 
individual member states or their sum. It seems that there is a limit to what the sum of 
the parts can do. This aspect will be further discussed in the light of the complexity 
theory. This concept is useful to see the work of the IMO within MGT.
The networker function addresses the purpose component 2, specially in the case of 
MGT where new ways to produce ideas and perspectives will help policy development 
considerably. The networking assures the purposes of IMO and through the all 
inclusiveness concept and it incorporates participants from the environment that are not 
the usual or traditional actors. The UN Millennium declaration (2000) stating the 
driving concepts into the next century, states the objective of, “To ensure greater policy 
coherence and better cooperation between the United Nations, its agencies..., as well as 
other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully coordinated approach to the 
problems of peace and development.” The central issue of reform of the UN has been
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trusted to the Commission of Global Governance, who in preparation for the Millennium 
Assembly central topic: "The United Nations of the 21st Century", which included a 
leaders Millennium Summit, issued its report “The Millennium Year and the Reform 
Process”, (1999). It states that “Governments, the UN Secretariat and NGOs should 
assign a high priority to developing a closer and more sustainable working relationship 
between the United Nations and civil society.” The coherence of the argument of all 
inclusiveness is firmly present at all levels of planning where the UN, in a demonstration 
of its will to take this concept towards implementation and in spite of the greater 
difficulties at higher levels, implemented the initiative of a Millennium Forum of NGOs. 
A large number of NGOs (1000 NGOs) met in parallel to the Millennium Assembly 
with the objective of making relations between civil society and the United Nations its 
first order of interest. Furthermore, the UNCGG report (1999) recommends
• Non-governmental fora sponsored by the UN should welcome participation by 
civil society groups representing a variety of viewpoints, including those 
critical of the world body and its policies.
• The General Assembly should act quickly to extend the rules and arrangements 
for NGO participation established in the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) resolution 1996/31 to itself and its main committees and working 
groups.
• All other UN bodies should review their arrangements for NGO participation 
and, where these fall short of the ECOSOC provisions, bring them into 
conformity as fully as possible.
This abundance of recommendations focalizes on the networking function of the UN and 
in a parallel way reaches out to reform and change towards the concept of Global 
Governance that the UN requires. The need for IMG to blend into the policies of the UN 
and to enrich them imposes a duty that can only be performed by networking in a similar
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way. When the issues of terrorism are present, there is an urgent call for' new ways and 
for the richness of multidisciplinary approaches.
It is a notable feature that the UNCGG report assigns the networking task to the 
Governments, the Secretariat and the NGOs in a way of networking outwards towards 
the civil society. In this way, the presence of the Secretariat is vital in order to elaborate 
concepts of networking that require the idea of wholeness to be submitted then to the 
member states and the NGOs. Thus, the Secretariat, with its added value, is part of the 
identity of the Whole that is greater than the sum of the parts.
5.4 The Environment component of the role of the IMO in the MGT
The environment of the role of the IMO is referred to as all the interests of individuals 
and institutions related to MG. The MGT is nourished also from the concept of the 
inclusion of the civil society by networking with the Organization; however, it can and 
may need to be extended to other non-maritime sectors. This allows for the new 
consideration of the influence of shipping (through trade) on non-maritime sectors and 
the possibilities of these non-maritime sectors to collaborate with an enrichment of ideas 
and different ways. An important example is the networking with other transport sectors 
to provide a seamless security chain for the logistic supply chain. Coulter, (1998), 
already stated, before the UNCGG reports and the WTC incidents, the importance of 
considering the logistic supply chain in security policies for the maritime sector. 
Evidently there is consensus among several sectors to agree on approaching the problem 
with a wide and inclusive perspective.
The consideration of the environment is an important issue within the functions of IMO 
because it helps all the other functions to broaden the scope and consider a far larger
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range of possibilities and in so doing it drifts away from static previous' structures that 
gravitate with a centrifugal force in stopping change.
5.5 A practical approach to the governance of uncertainty in the Role of the 
IMO within the MGT
The characteristic of the MGT is that it has the element of uncertainty present at all 
levels as seen in chapter 2. However, the governance approach to the problem can be 
applied in the light of the purpose components 1 and 2 of the role as expressed before, 
more specifically to the distinction between policy level and instrumental level actions.
Uncertainty is in all levels of decision, policy and instrumental. In the level of 
instrumental measures, uncertainty is addressed with the establishment of the procedures 
for maritime security on ships and ports. Uncertainty will never be eliminated due to the 
fact that until the incident is performed, the effectiveness of the measures will not be 
known, and when the incident happens, uncertainty is no longer an issue. Therefore, 
uncertainty, in instrumental measures, is an element that cannot be measured nor can it 
eliminated. In the instrumental level, uncertainty can be interpreted as an exogenous 
process where the triggering incident and the activity is external to the IMO.
In the policy level, uncertainty can be minimized by the networking and extensive 
inclusion of different actors in order to develop a mechanism that considers all the 
interests minimizing the uncertainty of those who are the required participants. The 
development of policies will guide the measures of protection of shipping that are 
required. Policy networking develops a system that harmonizes objectives and ways to 
reach them. This system is similar to the system that will be needed to deal with further 
issues during the incidents that were not considered. Policy issues require time to
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develop since the mechanism needs to be running to produce the meeting of the minds, 
whereas the instrumental measures are more straight-forward since protection measures 
are directed to actions and facts. If there is any difficulty of agreement in instrumental 
measures it will be due to differences in policies among member states. In this, NGOs 
can help considerable to moderate positions with their technical knowledge and the 
perspective of the overall impact on trade. An example of the needs for policies, is the 
ambiguity in the interpretation of levels of security to be assigned to ships and ports by 
each national administration stated in MSC 75/17. A policy on security levels would 
avoid discrepancies that create considerable anxiety, objective pursued by terrorism 
according to Schmid’s definition, (1983). At a policy level, uncertainty can be 
considered and endogenous process, where the activity is internal to the IMO and the 
triggering incidents are the principles are the duty of governance.
On a much higher level for IMO is the request of “policy making in IMO - setting the 
Organizations policies and objectives” annex 6 to Assembly Resolution A.909 (22) 
(2000) a furtherance to A.900 (21) (1999) “Objective of the Organization in the 2000s.” 
It is crucial to revise this task under the role components expressed above. In the light of 
uncertainty the lack of definition of these policies and objectives is an uncertainty 
generator, which in times of crisis hampers the Governance of any issue. Since the main 
threat of terrorism to governance is of not being able to deal with the problem, the lack 
of policy making would contribute to increase the probability of success of terrorism 
even before an incident appears.
In summary, the management of uncertainty may be divided in two areas, the policy 
issues and the instrumental measures. The uncertainty in the policy area should be 
minimized as far as possible because this uncertainty is, to great extent, dependent on 
the IMO itself The uncertainty of instrumental measures is unavoidable since it depends 
on the performing incident that carries in itself such a high degree of uncertainty by
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nature that it is impossible for the organization or national administrations to diminish it 
further than by the implementation of measures.
A word can be said about the mechanism that has initiated the request for policy 
building through these UN Assembly resolutions (A.900 & A.909) and others previous 
to these. The concept of the identity of the “whole greater than the sum of the parts” can 
be used again in this case. In all cases the initiatives have come from some member state 
or the proposal of the Council. There is an element of change in the organizations as 
seen in the Millennium UNCGG report that is the Secretariat. The Secretariat has a wide 
overall view of problems that could be very useful to promote suggestions on policy 
issues since it concentrates all of IMO affairs. The added value of the Secretariat is a 
valuable opportunity for the Council to have a relatively objective view and opinion 
without the influence or interests that by their nature lie within the national governments. 
The research and development of integrated proposals that the Secretariat may have the 
ability to develop as a contribution of unique added value cannot be brought to 
consideration without a creative IMO Secretariat. Likewise, it would be of invaluable 
importance to put the challenge to the NGOs where a different point of view may arise 
and it would be complying with the spirit of change suggested and already underway by 
the UN Secretary-General.
5.6 A theoretical approach to the role of IMO in the MGT
The role of IMO may be considered in the light of some simple concepts of the Theory 
of Complexity. This Theory is relatively new and has an interesting approach towards 
organizations and their potantial. The theory has a mathematical basis for proof and can 
be interpreted in its principles. The usefulness to assimilate it to the role of IMO is that 
under this theory organizations are seen as complex systems. The views on their
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properties give very interesting insights on how the capacities are inhibited or facilitated 
according to the different characteristics of the organizations.
To introduce the subject, a simple definition of a complex system by Waldrop (1993) is, 
“in the sense that a great many independent agents are interacting with each other in a 
great many ways.” If we compare it with the definition of Global Governance UNCGG 
report (1995) “JTie sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs”, we can see a large similarity between both. Thus, we 
could say that Global Governance, and extensively MGT, may fall into the concept of a 
complex system.
The theory of emergent properties states that in complex systems, properties emerge and 
that they can not be reduced to the set of elements that when summed make up the 
system. In other words; the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When a system 
reaches a certain threshold of complexity these properties bring forth a new identity that 
cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. This new identity is an added value to the 
organization and is seen in the distinctive patterns of behaviours that arise, for example 
within the General Assembly of the IMO and all of the UN bodies and specialized 
agencies. These patterns of behaviour are not present outside the assembly or meeting. 
This concerns also the process of crisis management that will have to be undertaken in a 
situation of repeated incidents as seen in the scenario.approach. If the meeting has added 
pressure, as was the situation of the Erika case deliberations for the accelerated phasing 
out of the single hull tankers, a more intense index of emerging patterns arise, adding to 
the difficulties to resolve and decide.
Another useful concept is Diversity, which is explained as the variety of the components 
of the complex systems. According to Axelrod & Cohen, (1995), the greater the variety 
within the components of a complex system the more fit it is. Within MO, the variety of
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the Organization is given by the different type of members that are included in the sum 
of the parts. Diversity was the concept used to bring together the Millennium Forum 
2000 by the Secretary General of the UN. Our first thoughts would induce us to think 
that the larger the diversity the more difficult to manage, however, the contrary is proven 
that the larger the diversity is, the fitter the system is for survival and more qualified to 
adapt to change. The apparent difficulties that come to mind are administrative or 
instrumental and not for example policy-building difficulties since the need for 
flexibility is taken care by the large number of different points of view. Hence, the 
participation of the member-states, the civil society, NGOs, the Secretariat as an 
individual entity and individuals will notably enrich the capacity to resolve the threat of 
not being able to deal with the problem of terrorism. In this manner, complexity and the 
concept of all inclusiveness go together and allow for the uncertainty to be reduced with 
innovation as is seen in the application of the theory to the outcome of bringing the 
largest diversity of components into MGT. An interesting parallelism can be drawn. The 
richness of the Assembly provided by the large diversity of cultures within it is at the 
same time a null diversified environment in the sense that all the members are only 
governments, that is, all alike. However, the participation of organizations of the 
character of NGOs brings diversity to the exclusiveness of the member state 
representative system.
5.6 The Role of the IMO and the role of its parts
The Role of the IMO^^ as has been built in the analysis of its four components and 
policy orientation and it is expanded in parallel to the UN reform and beyond the IMO’s
This discussion involves and concentrates many elements that have been developed previously. The 
elements of diversity, variety, emerging identities, complexity threshold belong to the complexity theory. 
The complexity theory is applied to the role component parts identified above in order to express a new 
composition of interests in MGT. The application has not been exhaustive and more is to be done.
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strictly technical objectives. The implementation of the role within the structure of the 
IMO is not the purpose of this study; however, a view into the derived roles of the 
component parts of the IMO may clarify the role of the Organization. The parts of the 
IMO to be considered will be the traditional structure and some additional components 
that may bring the concept of all inclusiveness into the Organization. Here we need to 
bring together various concepts developed previously: representativeness, purpose, 
function, position, environment, diversity and complexity, identity of the whole and 
fitness of Governance to survive. The essence of integrating a diverse range of 
participants into MGT is directed towards maximizing diversity’^ and implementing the 
idea of an organization fit for survival’'^ under the complexity theory'^, but above all it is 
directed towards representativeness. Governance, in essence, is about successfully 
representing the interests of all parts involved in common affairs. If the representation of 
interests is successful in the sense of its fidelity to real life then the system of 
Governance is naturally self-balancing and self moderating, leading to the self-reduction 
of the risks of sectorism. If representativeness is not successful then the exclusion of 
interests is produced. This exclusion should not necessarily be viewed as intentional, but 
as a deficiency of the representative principles that rule the system. Here, the principles 
of Constitutional Law, that are jurisdictionally national in scope, when applied to 
International Organizations provide a fruitful and valuable tool. A traditional example of 
applied principles of Constitutional Law to International Organizations, which
Complexity is not a synonym of difficulty and they should not be associated since self regulation is one of 
the emerging identities found within complex systems and that brings solutions that normative regulations 
caimot provide within regulatory systems. On the contrary, it should be considered whether highly 
normative regulatory approaches are not more “difficuh” to implement in real life than “fit systems.” As 
an example, IMO’s extensive regulatory framework can be cited, where the burden to those who must put 
the effort and ehergy to “make the system work” may be the core difficulty of the system.
In ecosystems diversity is a main component of fitness.
Survival is adapting to change and the new challenges that sometimes are thfeats. Systems either grow 
or die, in perceivable or unperceivable speeds. Systems are not static in their form or their life.
The threshold of complexity where new identities (of the whole or out of networking) emerge is. the line 
that is drawn between the growth and the extinction of a system. Diversity is the measure of fitness 
because diversity is the characteristic that raises the threshold to reach the point of the emergence of these 
new identities.
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incidentally and at present is under critics and reform, is the UN system with its 
Constitutional Charter.
The principles of Constitutional Law applied with the complexity theory are the tools to 
expand the environment and bring diversity into play and make the system of 
governance fit for challenge. However, Constitutional Law, which is the tool, which we 
view as essential in a new approach towards the representation of interests in MG, is 
also under critics and change. It is a fact that all mentioned theories are at the same time 
questioned and questioning. The canons of Constitutional Law are being revised, the UN 
is under reform, the complexity theory presents a new view to organizational functioning 
and the MGT challenges the regulatory principles of governance to change towards a 
different model. All these changes and challenges are taking place simultaneously and 
are an indication that the system and model of representativeness is evolving. This 
invites us to interpret that it could be possible that the models, which institutions of 
today are using, might be obsolete to represent the actual real interests involved. If this 
were the case then obsolescence is already within the constitutional framework and the 
constitutional system is not providing the results that society needs. This is the measure 
of change that indicates that the need for change in IMO comes mainly from the MG 
environment component of its role acting as the incentive to all the other components.
Balkin et al (1998) are of the opinion that Constitutional Law requires the inclusion of 
views other than judicial or legal to enrich the interpretation of Constitutions.
The narrowness of cunent canonical materials has had unfortunate effects for constitutional 
theory and legal education, encouraging too much specialization and focusing attention away 
from basic questions about the justice of the legal system. A revitalized constitutional canon 
should pay attention to structural questions that do not often come before courts, and it 
should include non-judicial interpreters of the Constitution, particularly representatives of
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political and social movements whose interpretations often shape and influence the direction 
of constitutional interpretation.
This expression concerning public national law when exported into international law 
will have a different expression of justice in the constitutional agreements of a 
governance system such as Maritime Governance. In the context of GG, the exported 
concept of justice as stated by Balkin et al (1998) is directed towards the just 
representation of all interests by incorporating other views into canonical sources. The 
nature of International Law, as soft law, views justice in the action of compliance with 
agreements and the concept of a court is exercised through the rule of consensus. Justice 
as the defense of the rights of fair participation and representation is not demanded or 
questioned by the interests that are not officially represented in the IMO. This is due to 
the fact that the reigning culture of representation excludes parts that are not national 
governments; however, there is an ample consideration of all non-member-state voiced 
opinions and the moderation of the consensus mechanism helps to reach a fair and 
balanced inclusion of interests that are present. This is progressing with time and the 
inclusion of NGOs is now widely accepted and encouraged. These valuable 
constitutional assets are the foundations to be developed further into a more modem 
representative system.
IMO has a formal Constitution in its own convention and indirectly in the UN Charter; 
and it also has an informal tacit constitution that underlies in the IMO culture and the 
mles of conduct that have developed during the years. This tacit constitution has 
strengthened the invaluable practice of unanimous consensus and through informal 
channels managed to include additional participants. This tacit constitution convenes 
also roles and codes of relationships of all other interests that are not within the 
traditional components of IMO; one of these other interests is the defenseless
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international identity of shipping as demonstrated during the Tanker War. How to 
achieve a fair and just representation of all the maritime interests is the challenge of 
IMO under a view of a new Constitutional Law approach that is needed to be applied to 
Maritime Governance.
The traditional structural parts of IMO are the Member States (MS), the NGOs and the 
Secretariat. The role of the member states is of paramount importance since it 
represents the political division of countries through the governmental mechanisms of 
organization that all nations have. Its value as a representative element of the world’s 
society is real and effective especially in regulatory issues. The role of NGOs has been 
described throughout this study in its value to support with knowledge and expertise the 
roles of downsizing national governments. The role of NGOs is growing under the UN 
reforms. Finally, the role of the Secretariat’^ is a valuable asset that can promote and 
stimulate development in aspects that the previous two components cannot.
The Secretariat and its two roles lie in what Dag Hammarskjdld as UN Secretary 
General clearly exposed in his valedictory speech on Staff Day 8 September 1961.
What is at stake is a basic question of principle: Is the Secretariat to develop as an 
international secretariat, with the full independence contemplated in Article 100 of the 
Charter, or is it to be looked upon as an intergovernmental - not international - secretariat 
providing merely the necessary administrative services for a conference machinery? This is a 
basic question and the answer to it affects not only the working of the Secretariat but the 
whole of the future of international relations.
The considerations of the Mannet report (2001) are oriented towards organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness of the functioning of the Secretariat. It is not related to the maritime governance roles of 
IMO as approached in this chapter.
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Dag Hammarskjold’s question was, and still is today, a matter of principle where the 
active and positive participation of the Secretary General can be a catalyst of 
improvement and the vivid example of the networking that is needed, and which no 
other component of MG can perform. The unique added value that the Secretariat can 
provide to the Role of IMO is of such importance in capacity building and confidence 
building that it cannot be dismissed to a “mere administrative service” as Hammarskjdld 
expressed it. It could be argued that the Secretariat of IMO is not comparable to the UN 
Secretariat. However, it should be observed that art.51 (Secretariat functions) of the 
IMO Convention (1948) reads as an exact copy of art. 100 (Secretariat functions) of the 
UN Charter. It would be reasonable to all arguments to profit from the roles and 
qualities that might be assimilated from the UN model to an MO model, bearing in 
mind the close relationship between both organizations and the respective jurisdictional 
differences. In the nature of maritime affairs and in regard to the international essence of 
shipping which excels far beyond that of many other institutions, it would be highly 
convenient to consider Dag Hammarskjold’s vision of the Secretariat for IMO’s model. 
In Mango’s view (1988) “the executive heads of specialized agencies have continued to 
take initiative within their field of competence” in relating to the essence of 
Hammarskjdld’s concept projected towards the specialized agencies. Today’s MO is in 
need for versatility and innovation, to network the changing needs of the maritime 
interests and specially to develop a MGT'^. The fields of competence of the Secretariat 
as mentioned are in the sense of innovation and progress and can hardly be thought of, in 
this context, as the basic administrative activities of the daily routine. This calls for the 
MO to seriously and explicitly go beyond the basic description of a Secretariat 
expressed by art.47 to 50 of the MO Convention (1948) and that resemble an 
administrative service.
The theory of fitness within complexity needs to receive incentives and this concept of Secretariat could 
be a way.
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Confidence building between all the parts of the MO is essential, specially within GG 
and within any project for the enhancement of activities. Mango (1988) expressed his 
views on the Secretariat’s role with respect of opinion. He commented that the valuable 
participation of the knowledge and experience within the secretariat of the IMO has a 
way to be incorporated to the consideration of the member states, and that this 
participation could be largely strengthened.
The new roles for components of the MO tend towards the participation of all interests 
that possibly need to be included in MG. These roles that are not traditional are 
expanding the environment component of the role of the MO and allowing for diversity 
and eventually concerning the fitness of MO and MG. This expansion can have many 
forms, some of which are the following:
• International NGOs not included'. There are a large number of NGOs that are not 
included in the MO but that are a part of MG due to their maritime nature. These 
range from commercial to technical institutions. Their lack of affiliation to the 
consultative members of the MO prevents them from accessing to a 
participating action.
• Local NGOs'. There are numerous local NGOs that have difficulties to reach their 
ways to participate in the MO due to the lack of access to their national 
member-state representation. The MSR in the national representations is not 
prepared to include local NGOs in a normative or even practical way.
• Non-maritime participants: The importance of shipping to world international 
trade is highly significant as has been mentioned several times in previous 
subjects of this study. This means that shipping affects also non-maritime 
interests. Non-maritime participants in MG can help to incorporate the 
international identity of shipping that is diffused at the time of needing 
intemationahprotection. Instrumentally, non-maritime participants will enrich the
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options towards the response in the security chain parallel to the supply logistic 
chain.
• Individual persons'. The concept of GG includes as participants not only 
institutions but also individuals. In this sense the inclusion of individuals ca:n 
bring expertise, experience and unbiased opinion into the exercise of MG. An 
example is the notable experience and expertise of member state representatives 
that upon ending their terms in office or in their positions are separated from the 
IMO and also from MG. To include individual persons within an IGO is a 
challenge that' will only provide benefits especially in the areas of knowledge, 
experience and research that the IMO is so needed of
Within the present structure of the MO there exist positive elements and favourable 
conditions to provide change towards a vigorous institution that will be at the center of 
the intense networking that international shipping requires in the concept of Maritime 
Governance. The complexity theory has been brought in to the forefront in several 
instances of reasoning and is once more an interesting recommendation for the concept 
of change within organizations in the words of Pavard & Dugdale stated on the 
permanent website of the COSIEU project 2000-2003,
Classical approaches to understanding organisations tend to view the organisation as existing 
in one state or another and that a ‘shake-up’ is required to move the organisation out of its 
current state. A complexity theory approach would view an organisation’s culture as 
constantly changing which raises the question of cultural stability. Rather than ‘planmng 
change’ the focus should change to ‘facilitating emergence’. One approach that has been 
recently tried is to increase the ‘connectivity’ of the agents in an organisation by removing 
interactional barriers and opening interactional chaimels to bring the system closer to a point 
where change and self-organisation becomes possible.
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These new concepts of the complexity theory fit the essence of Global Governance in 
the line of the thoughts of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for the Millennium 
Assembly, Summit and Forum and provide an important motivation for an organization 
like IMO to move towards a strategy on Maritime Governance with an all inclusiveness 
principle. To reach out to consultancy is beneficial in the aspects that can exempt the 
organization to look upon itself, however, the uniqueness of the organization’s styles, 
ways, patterns and complexity prove an immeasurable task for an outsider and to which 
the answers seem to lie within.
In order to produce the necessary change for the new role of the IMO developed in this 
chapter, new elements have been incorporated in to MGT, guided under the new 
approach of the UN Commission on Global Governance, using a new tool that is the 
theory of complexity, and all together in the light of an old Hammarskjdld concept of 
networking of international organizations. This process necessarily progresses in these 
steps to develop the strategy and policy structure that the Maritime Governance of 
Terrorism needs for the Role of the IMO in pursuance of the final objective, that is: The 
Protection of Shipping.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
To conclude the outlook on the Role of the IMO in the Maritime Governance of 
Terrorism in one chapter and in this one study is by itself inconclusive, as appendix III 
indicates with the progressive emergence of questions for further research’corresponding 
to each chapter. Therefore the objective of this chapter aspires to bring the abstraction of 
the concept of Global Governance into a more tangible concept of Maritime Governance 
through the Role of the IMO in the MG of Terrorism. It also has the objective to be open 
to further development.
The chapter presents an integrated summary of the role of the IMO within MGT and that 
develops the implications of terrorism within Maritime Governance. It states the 
difficulties of the protection of shipping and ways to approach success through the UN 
and its vision towards the 2U* Century. The Role of the IMO is the central focus of the 
strategy and the needs for a new direction are stated. A set of conclusions is presented in 
point form to serve as a basis for the recommendations that follow.
6,1 The role of the IMO in the Maritime Governance of terrorism
The characteristics of global terrorism show a different type of violence than the 
previous experiences of piracy and the Tanker War of 1984-1988. Terrorism as 
experienced in the WTC attacks cannot be confined to a local or even regional
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phenomenon. The vulnerability of the region is directly proportional to the intensity of 
the trade routes. The significance of the targets is also related to the effects that the 
incident will have on trade and development, such as the WTC attack that affected 
directly the New York Stock Exchange. Thus, trade is an indirect victim that will affect 
the economies of countries according to their participation in it.
The protection against terrorism requires policies and instrumental measures. Policies 
are required in order to develop a plan to make decisions and guide actions towards 
objectives in a multilateral action of all states to protect their interests. Instrumental 
measures are the final outcome of a process of policies that need to be implemented in a 
harmonized way. However, terrorism creates situations with pressure on decision 
making mechanisms and uncertainty is the common factor at all levels. Uncertainty at a 
policy level is avoidable or can be minimized by previous policy & strategy making 
through objectives. Uncertainty is also the most dangerous threat at this level if there are 
no policies or strategies to lead to quick understanding and the protection of shipping 
without overreacting. Uncertainty at the instrumental level is unavoidable until the 
incident is performed. Thus, the key to success lies in policy & strategy making as an 
approach that can minimize uncertainty.
Shipping has had an independent nature from governments in the past that has given it 
freedom of navigation and its international characteristics. However, its international 
nature has become much more so with the use of international registries and multiple 
owners. This has given shipping an identity that is beyond the interests of national 
governments at the time of providing protection against violence. Piracy, which is still at 
large today with increasing statistic trends of incidents and violence, has not been 
controlled and the ships are without defense. During the Tanker -War ships did not 
receive protection from third countries due to their avoidance of commitment. Thus, the 
ships traded without protection. Protection is not only physical but also financial since it
is seen from experience that the consequences of terrorist incidents require also financial 
support from governments in situations of catastrophic characteristics. These are the 
basic requirements that the maritime community needs to address since the national 
governments for a variety of reasons systematically postpone shipping in their list of 
priorities. International registries will receive the worst impact in terrorist situations 
since, in general, they are not capable of providing physical or financial protection to 
their ships in a repeated situation .of terrorist violence. All sources of analysis trace the 
possible solutions to the UN Security Council.
A new strategy is needed since the previous experiences do not give any indication that 
ships will enjoy protection in future similar situations. Being the UN, the body that is 
closest to the global identity of shipping and considering its 21®' Century plans for 
reforms, a strategy for the protection of shipping networked within these UN reforms is 
a new approach with new opportunities. The concept of Global Governance of including 
the participation of civil society provides new ideas and ways to manage- the common 
affairs. It provides an opportunity for a more substantive representation of the 
international identity of shipping rather than the diffused identity that shipping had 
during the Tanker War or that shipping has now in the events of piracy, both of which 
have not manage to obtain protection. The call for a governance regime for the 
protection of ships against piracy by national representatives at UNICPOLOS implies, 
according to regime theory, rules and a decision-making mechanism. Once again, policy 
building is the essential cornerstone of the strategy for the protection of shipping.
The measures for the protection of shipping after the WTC attacks were unanimously 
concentrated in the IMO evidencing its representativeness in matters for maritime 
security. However, the urgent requirement for policy building is outside the customary 
practices of the IMO that circumscribes itself to technical matters that regulate shipping. 
Maritime Governance, the application of GG to maritime interests, is the concept that
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will provide the networking and the guiding principles to policy building and, at the 
same time, maintain the distinctive responsibilities of Governments and the NGOs. The 
objective of obtaining a protection regime for shipping through a more representative | 
international identity in the UN system is of the interests of both national governments | 
and NGOs and will eventually contribute to protect the benefits of the trade of all , 
nations. The IMO’s responsibility requires to be taken extensively in order to approach 1 
subjects of higher policy level in the networking of the NGOs, all in the search for the 
protection of shipping that governments have difficulties in providing. NGOs do not 
have another forum to discuss these matters and the protection of shipping is within the 
IMO’s jurisdiction. A way must be found to include these priorities within the IMO so 
that the protection of shipping is not left to lobbying, as was the unsuccessful case of the 
Tanker War described in chapter IV.
The development of scenarios according to the degrees of terrorism will give the basis 
for further policy building. The objectives identified for the specific case of Maritime 
Governance of terrorism are guides towards measuring the efficiency of the inclusion of 
all the relevant interests of shipping. All inclusiveness is a key element of GG and MG. 
Therefore; it is all inclusiveness acting as the main pillar that will enable interests that 
are not represented by national governments to be considered regardless of the 
difficulties in finding a way to represent them within the forum that is the IMO. The 
difficulties of including all interests will require new solutions, much in a similar 
concept to the reforms of the UN main bodies, which are already under way, in the same 
direction, and with a far greater dimension of difficulties. The comprehensiveness of the 
method is a versatile and flexible response to the changing needs of the uncertainty of a 
terrorist scenario.
The Role of the IMO in the Maritime Governance of terrorism needs to be seen in the 
light of its purposes, position, functions and the environment that is the maritime and
93
non-maritime related sectors of governments and civil society. The objectives of the 
IMO require a direct policy concern Avith matters related to the relationship with the 
UNSC as mentioned in art. VI of the UN-IMO agreement. This requires the development 
of new ways to represent the extra-national identity of shipping as could be through 
NGO meetings as suggested in the millennium reforms presented by the UN Secretary 
General. This approach has theoretical support with the complexity theory stating that 
organizations are fitter when their diversity is greater. This diversity requires networking 
and this is a fundamental role of the MO to enhance the richness of options in all 
aspects in favour and service of the protection of International Shipping.
6.2 Conclusions
The following conclusions are synthetically presented:
C 01 Shipping has not had protection in previous situations of violence and there are 
no mechanisms in force that will assure its protection in similar or different 
terrorist circumstances in the future.
C 02 The MO is the legitimate international organization to represent the interests of 
international shipping, however, the MO has no experience in obtaining results 
in the protection of shipping.
C 03 Member states, represented at the MO, do not have the capacity to fully 
represent the international interests of shipping. In the past, other national 
interests have involuntarily sided the member state participation in the protection 
of shipping in demand of other needed course of action
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C 04 The issue of representativeness of NGOs by and within the IMO is an issue that 
falls, in principle, within the jurisdiction of concepts of constitutional law applied 
to international organization. The new concepts require new solutions in the 
principles of representativeness of all the interests.
C 05 Member states at the IMO need to network more with NGOs at the national level 
in order to bring in the national NGO perspectives.
C 06 The IMO is reactive partly due tg the absence of policy building mechanisms 
originated in its technical nature.
C 07 The IMO Secretariat needs to function more as a networker within the policy 
building of diverse participants of maritime and non-maritime sectors towards a 
concept of maritime governance.
C 08 The effects and implications of Maritime Governance have a much broader 
spectrum than shipping regulations extending the reach towards ports but also 
towards non-maritime affairs.
C 09 The networking with NGOs at all levels is essential to build up a security chain 
that runs parallel to the logistic supply chain. Capacity building and confidence 
building are networking elements that in a diverse and rich environment of MGT 
solutions will arise naturally. The Secretariat has an important role in this 
networking.
C 10 A timely and successful response to terrorism can only be obtained by 
incorporating all the participants involved in securing the maritime interests.
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C 11 Policies in national and regional levels for the MGT require insertion in an 
overall international umbrella policy that will ensure harmonization and 
seamlessness of strategies and instrumental measures.
C 12 A situation of repeated incidents of terrorist violence on shipping will demand 
protection for shipping as a physical protection of ships and financial 
government support under similar principles of the aide to natural catastrophes.
C 13 Flag States of international or open registries will receive the strongest impact in 
a situation of repeated violence since they will not be able to provide protection 
to the ships under their flag. The protection should be viewed in both physical 
and financial terms.
C 14 The role of the Secretariat in all international organizations is viewed from two 
perspectives: a) the catalytic engine that aides member state representatives to 
network between themselves and with other institutions and adds a value that no 
other component of the organization can provide, and b) an administrative role 
that provides the convention making machinery.
C 15 The IMO requires a research capacity to develop knowledge that is within its role 
and sphere of competence. No other organization can have the perspective that 
the IMO has with the inclusion of the secretariat. The secretariat needs the 
capacity to expand the knowledge and insight for the needs of its bodies and 
member states. This capacity will be the basis for the policy building that the 
Organization needs and that the member states need.
C 16 The ship and port interface require greater interaction between the parts with 
more representation of ports within the IMO member states and bodies. The
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security chain needs to have a single source of regulations and in parallel to the 
logistic chain.
6.3 Recommendations
The following recommendations are intended to be a basis for the role of the IMO in the
MGT. The recommendations are not extensive since they are to be interpreted within the
context of this study and not individually or separately.'
R 01 The IMO has a part to play in the world’s decision-making process of terrorism 
as a whole. As an institution it should participate and contribute to this process 
within a higher-level action among the bodies of the UN in order to then bring 
down the policies to the maritime communities and the MGT. The Secretary 
General has an important role to play as a representative of the decisions of the 
Assembly and the Council of the IMO within the networking of UN bodies.
R 02 The IMO needs to approach policy building within its main bodies.
R 03 The IMO needs to establish decision-making mechanisms in order to configure 
its conventions within a maritime regime. The decision-making mechanisms are 
not dispute settlement procedures that are already existent. They are strategy 
mechanisms.
R 04 The IMO needs to have a. new approach to the issue of how to protect shipping of 
third flags within conflicts or terrorist situations similar to the actual situation of 
lack of protection in piracy attacks. The approach needs to be trough NGO
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representation within the concept of GG in compatibility with government 
participation. The issue needs to consider constitutional law procedures.
R 05 The IMO requires an umbrella policy for the Maritime Governance of terrorism 
networked with all other conventions on terrorism and upwards with the UNSC 
policies so that national governments can insert their national policies in a 
harmonized way.
R06 Policy building in Maritime Governance workshops should be performed for 
member states with 4 objectives: to aide them in developing their own policies, 
to integrate them to the IMO’s umbrella policy for terrorism, to aide them in 
networking with NGOs at the national level and to aide them in building the 
security chain.
R 07 The roles of the individual parts of the IMO, member states, NGOs and the 
Secretariat can be incremented with non traditional components such as 
International NGOs not included, local NGOs, non-maritime participants and 
individual persons.
R 08 The role of the Secretariat of the IMO should be oriented towards the perspective 
a) of Conclusion 14 being a networker of the MGT. The perspective b) is the 
responsibility of the administrative systems of the Secretariat.
R 09 A way must be found for the inclusion of individual persons to participate within 
the IMO in the concept of GG, in order to avoid losing expertise and experience 
of delegates of mernber states and other sources that are separated from the 
Organization for whatever reason it may be.
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RIO The guide for further research in appendix III is also a starting point for measures 
in developing diversity within the system of the IMO. In this research new ways 
will emerge for networking and developing policies for the protection of 
shipping.
The Conclusions and recommendations to the role of the IMO in the Maritime 
Governance of Terrorism mentioned above are the initial steps to the intense 
brainstorming that is needed for policy building. The set of new tools that have been 
exposed can provide the Organization with a fresh and vigorous way to approach the 
complexities of terrorism. The insight to the prevention of acts of violence has many 
sides that need to be integrated and harmonized within the maritime and non-maritime 
community. Trade and progress must continue their development in spite of the 
drawbacks of violence and the difficulties of economies. Whichever the approach 
towards the response against terrorism in Maritime Governance the measures that are 
merely instrumental should not oversee the policies and the policy building processes 
should prevail. The presence of policies and strategies will orient the efforts towards the 
final objective that should be present at all levels, from the UN to the minor institutions 
and individuals that are networking. The final objective cannot be the measures to 
enhance security for then we would be accepting to live in a world of permanent violent 
confrontation. The permanent objective should be for each institution and each 
individual to contribute, at their level and to higher levels, to the principle of eliminating 
terrorism and the use of violence. No one institution or individual may in their 
conscience delegate this principle to other bodies or persons under the allegation that it 
is not within their jurisdiction. The concept of a// inclusiveness brings the jurisdiction of 
the duty to participate to the conscience of individuals and institutions in the 
understanding that this is what human nature is in essence.
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APPENDIX I
CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM
1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft 
(“Tokyo Convention,” 1963).
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“Hague 
Convention,” 1970)
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (“Montreal Convention,” 1971)
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons (1973)
5. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (“Hostages 
Convention,” 1979)
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (“Nuclear 
Materials Convention,” 1980)
7. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, (1988)
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (1988)
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
(1991)
11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997 UN 
General Assembly Resolution)
12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(1999)
Summaries of the multilateral treaties
deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General
1. ’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973
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The Convention applies to the crimes of direct involvement or complicity in the murder, 
kidnapping, or attack, whether actual, attempted or threatened, on the person, official 
premises, private accommodation or means of transport of diplomatic agents and other 
"internationally protected persons". Internationally protected persons are defined as 
Heads of State or Government, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, State officials and 
representatives of international organizations entitled to special protection in a foreign 
State, and their families.
States Parties have obligations to establish their jurisdiction over the offences described, 
make the offences punishable by appropriate penalties, take alleged offenders into 
custody, prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, cooperate in preventive measures, and 
exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal proceedings. The 
offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences between 
States Parties under existing extradition treaties, and under the Convention itself
2. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, New York, 17 December 
1979
The Convention applies to the offence of direct involvement or complicity in the seizure 
or detention of, and threat to kill, injure or continue to detain a hostage, whether actual 
or attempted, in order to compel a State, an international intergovernmental organization, 
a person or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or 
implicit condition for the release of the hostage.
Each State Party is required to make this offence punishable by appropriate penalties. 
Where hostages are held in the territory of a State Party, the State Party is obligated to 
take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostages and secure 
their release. After the release of the hostages. States Parties are obligated to facilitate 
the departure of the hostages. Each State Party is obligated to take such actions as may 
be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offence of taking of hostages.
States Parties have obligations to establish their jurisdiction over the offences described, 
make the offences punishable by appropriate penalties, take alleged offenders into 
custody, prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, cooperate in preventive measures, and 
exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal proceedings. The 
offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences between 
States Parties under existing extradition treaties, and under the Convention itself
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3. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New York, 15 
December 1997
The Convention applies to the offence of the intentional and unlawful delivery, 
placement, discharge or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device, whether 
attempted or actual, in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government 
facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility, with the intent to 
cause death or serious bodily injury, or extensive destruction likely to or actually 
resulting in major economic loss. Any person also commits an offence if that person 
participates as an accomplice in any of these acts, organizes others to commit them or in 
any other way contributes to their commission. The Convention does not apply where an 
act of this nature does, not involve any international elements as defined by the 
Convention.
States Parties are required to establish jurisdiction over and make punishable, under their 
domestic laws, the offences described, to extradite or submit for prosecution persons 
accused of committing or aiding in the commission of the offences, and to assist each 
other in connection with criminal proceedings under the Convention. The offences 
referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences between States 
Parties under existing extradition treaties, and under the Convention itself
4. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New 
York, 9 December 1999
The Convention applies to the offence of direct involvement or complicity in the 
intentional and unlawful provision or collection of funds, whether attempted or actual, 
with the intention or knowledge that any part of the funds may be used to carry out any 
of the offences described in the Conventions listed in the Annex, or an act intended to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to any person not actively involved in armed 
conflict in order to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an 
international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. The provision or 
collection of funds in this manner is an offence whether or not the funds are actually 
used to carry out the proscribed acts. The Convention does not apply where an act of this 
nature does not involve any international elements as defined by the Convention.
The Convention requires each State Party to take appropriate measures, in accordance 
with its domestic legal principles, for the detection and freezing, seizure or forfeiture of
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any funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing the offences described. The 
offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences and States 
Parties have obligations to establish their jurisdiction over the offences described, make 
the offences punishable by appropriate penalties, take alleged offenders into custody, 
prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, cooperate in preventive measures and 
countermeasures, and exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal 
proceedings. The offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable 
offences between States Parties under existing extradition treaties, and under the 
Convention itself
Summaries of the multilateral treaties deposited 
with other depositaries
5. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
Tokyo, 14 September 1963 (*)
The Convention applies to offences and other acts prejudicial to good order and 
discipline on board an aircraft, committed while the aircraft is in flight or on the surface 
of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State. It does not apply 
to State aircraft, for example, aircraft used in military, customs and police services.
The purpose of the Tokyo Convention is to protect the safety of the aircraft and of the 
persons or property thereon and to maintain good order and discipline on board. The 
aircraft commander, members of the crew and, in specific circumstances, even 
passengers on board, is empowered to prevent the commission of such acts and to 
disembark the person concerned. The aircraft commander may also disembark the 
offender or, if the offence is serious, deliver him to the competent authorities of a 
Contracting State when the aircraft lands. The Convention protects the aircraft 
commander and any crew member or passenger assisting him in imposing the measures 
he finds necessary from any proceedings in respect of actions taken by them.
The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over 
offences and acts committed on board. Each Contracting State is obliged to take the
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necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration. The 
Convention does not eliminate existing or future jurisdiction in States other than the 
State of registration. A Contracting State which is riot the State of registration may not 
interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an 
offence committed on board except in certain cases, for instance, the offence has been 
effected in the territory of the State overflown, the offence has been committed by or 
against a national or permanent resident of that State, and the offence is against the 
security of that State.
6. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16 
December 1970 (*)
The Convention defines the act of unlawful seizure of aircraft, and the Contracting 
States have undertaken to make such an offence punishable by severe penalties. Under 
the provisions of The Hague Convention a State is obliged, whether or not it is the State 
of registration, to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it 
does not extradite him. If there is no extradition treaty between the States concerned and 
the offender is in the territory of a Contracting State and that State refuses to extradite 
the offender, then it must submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution under its criminal law.
The Convention requires any Contracting State in which the aircraft or its passengers or 
crew are present to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew 
as soon as possible and to return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled 
to possession without delay.
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, Montreal, 23 September 1971 (*)
The Convention deals with acts other than those covered by the Tokyo and The Hague 
Conventions. The Montreal Convention defines a wide spectrum of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation and the Contracting States have undertaken to make 
these offences punishable by severe penalties. The Convention contains detailed 
provisions on jurisdiction, custody, prosecution and extradition of the alleged offender
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similar to those of The Hague Convention. Like the Tokyo and The Hague Conventions, 
the Montreal Convention does not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or police 
services. This Convention attempts to establish a form of universal jurisdiction over the 
offender, as provided in Article 5(1) of the Convention. The scope of the Convention is 
primarily determined in terms of the "international element" provided in Article 1, sub- 
paragraphs 1(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). The Convention applies, irrespective of whether the 
aircraft is engaged in international or domestic flight, only as provided in Article 4(2) of 
the Convention, namely, if:
the place of take-off or landing, actual or intended, of the aircraft is situated outside the 
territory of the State of registration of the aircraft; or
the offence is committed in the territory of a State other than the State of registration of 
the aircraft.
In the ease of air navigation facilities mentioned in Article 1, sub-paragraph 1 (d), the 
Convention applies only if the facilities destroyed, damaged, or interfered with are used 
in international air navigation.
8. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 3 March 1980
The Physical Protection Convention has a twofold objective:
it establishes levels of physical protection required to be applied to nuclear material used 
for peaceful purposes while in international nuclear transport and it also provides for 
measures against unlawful acts with respect to such material while in international 
nuclear transport as well as in domestic use, storage and transport.
Although the levels or physical protection prescribed in the Convention are required to 
be applied only to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while international 
nuclear transport, other provisions of the Convention (e.g., the requirements that relate 
to making specified acts punishable offences under national law, to establishing 
jurisdiction over those offences and to prosecuting or extraditing alleged offenders) 
apply also to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage 
and transport. Accordingly, States Parties to the Convention are obliged to make 
punishable under their national law the intentional commission of offences with respect 
to nuclear material as listed in its Article 7, in particular, intentional commission of: acts 
without lawful authority dealing with nuclear material causing or likely to cause death or 
serious injury or damage to any person or property; theft or robbery of nuclear material;
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embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; demands for nuclear material 
by any form of intimidation; threats to use nuclear material to cause death or serious 
injury or damage to any person or property; or threats to steal nuclear material to compel 
a person, international organization or State to do or refrain from doing any act. The 
Convention also contains specific rules on jurisdiction and extradition.
9. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, 24 February 1988 (*)
The Protocol adds to the definition of "offence" given in the Montreal Convention of 
1971 unlawful and intentional acts of violence against persons at an airport serving 
international civil aviation which cause or are likely to cause serious injury or death and 
such acts which destroy or seriously damage the facilities of such an airport or aircraft 
not in service located thereon or disrupt the services of the airport; the qualifying 
element of these offences is the fact that such an act endangers or is likely to endanger 
safety at that airport. These offences are punishable by severe penalties, and Contracting 
States are obliged to establish jurisdiction over the offences not only in the case where 
the offence was committed in their territory but also in the case where the alleged 
offender is present in their territory and they do not extradite him to the State where the 
offence took place.
10. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1988
The Convention applies to the offences of direct involvement or complicity in the 
intentional and unlawful threatened, attempted or actual endangerment of the safe 
navigation of a ship by the commission of any of the following acts: seizure of or 
exercise of control over a ship by any form of intimidation; violence against a person on 
board a ship; destruction of a ship or the causing of damage to a ship or to its cargo; 
placement on a ship of a device or substance which is likely to destroy or cause damage 
to that ship or its cargo; destruction of, serious damaging of, or interference with 
maritime navigational facilities; knowing communication of false information; injury to 
or murder of any person in connection with any of the preceding acts. The Convention 
applies to ships navigating or scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond
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the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial 
sea with adjacent States, or when the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State 
Party.
The Convention does not apply to warships, ships owned or operated by a State when 
being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes or ships that have been 
withdrawn from navigation or laid up.
The offences referred to in the Convention are deemed to be extraditable offences and 
States-parties have obligations to establish their jurisdiction over the offences described, 
make the offences punishable by appropriate penalties, take alleged offenders into 
custody, prosecute or extradite alleged offenders, cooperate in preventative measures, 
and exchange information and evidence needed in related criminal proceedings.
11. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms located on the Continental Shelf, Rome, 10 March 1988
The Protocol applies to the offences described in the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation when committed in relation to 
a "fixed platform", defined as an artificial island, installation or structure permanently 
attached to the sea-bed for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of resources or for 
other economic purposes.
States-parties have obligations in relation to establishing their jurisdiction over the 
offences described, making the offences punishable by appropriate penalties, taking 
alleged offenders into custody and prosecuting or extraditing them.
12. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
Montreal, 1 March 1991 (*)
The Convention requires each State Party to prohibit and prevent the manufacture in its 
territory of unmarked plastic explosives. Plastic explosives will be marked by 
introducing during the manufacturing process any one of the detection agents defined in 
the Technical Annex to the Convention. The Convention also requires each State Party 
to prohibit and prevent the movement into or out of its territory of unmarked explosives
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and to exercise strict and effective control over the possession of any existing stocks of 
unmarked explosives. Stocks of plastic explosives not held by authorities performing 
military and police functions are to be destroyed or consumed for purposes not 
inconsistent with the objectives of the Convention, marked or rendered permanently 
ineffective, within a period of three years from the entry into force of the Convention in 
respect of the State concerned.
The Convention also establishes an International Explosives Technical Commission, 
experts in the field of manufacture or detection of, or research in, explosives. The 
Commission will evaluate technical developments relating to the manufacture, marking 
and detection of explosives, report its findings, through the Council of ICAO, to all 
States Parties and international organizations concerned, and propose amendments to the 
Technical Annex to the Convention, as required.
(*) Summary courtesy of ICAO 
(**) Summary courtesy of IAEA
Source : http://untreatv.un.0rg/English/tersumen.htm#l
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APPENDIX II
SECURITY MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE INTERSESSIONAL WORKING 
GROUP ON THE “PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM
• AGAINST SHIPPING”
These measures were proposed by the Maritime Safety Committee’s Intersessional 
Working Group on Maritime Security in the report document MSC 75/WP.18 in May 
2002 to be accepted in Diplomatic Conference in December 2002.
Chronoloev of the responsive measures
2001 September 11 
2001 November 29
2001 December 3
2002 February 11
2002 May 22
2002 May 22
2002 December
Attacks on WTC and Pentagon
IMG Assembly Resolution A.924 (22) Review of measures and 
procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security 
of passengers and crews and the safety of ships.
MO call for the intersessional working group (ISWG) on 
maritime security for February 11-15 2002 with proposals and 
information on security issues. IMO Circular letter No. 2351 Ref. 
T2/2.02
Meeting of the ISWG. Analysis of 12 proposals and 8 information 
papers and elaboration of recommendations. MSC Provisional list 
of Documents for ISWG meeting (including agenda) document 
MSC75/ISWG/J/1.
Meeting of the working group on Maritime Security (MSWG).
(54 member states, 3 UN and special agencies, 3 inter­
governmental (IGO) organizations, 24 NGOs in consultative 
status). Report to MSC. MSC 75/WP.18
Meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee accepting the 
proposed recommendations and with further proposal to the 
Diplomatic Conference in December 2002 
Scheduled meeting in Diplomatic Conference of member states 
and expected acceptance of measures.
Note: It is understood that the member states at MO can adopt these
measures in their own state as national regulatory measures if the 
situation urges, however, it is desirable to avoid unilateralism in 
the light of multilateral consensus and the important need of 
harmonization.
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Automatic Identification Systems
The ISWG agreed in principle to accelerate the implementation schedule for the 
mandatory fitting of Automatic Identification Systems for all ships of 500 gross tonnage 
and above, on international voyages. The final implementation date would be decided by 
the Diplomatic Conference on maritime security.
The requirement for ships to carry AIS was adopted in December 2000 as part of a new 
chapter V on Safety of Navigation in the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS).
The.requifement, entering into force on 1 July 2002, applies to all ships constructed after 
1 July 2002, and to other ships on a phase-in schedule up to 1 July 2008. The 
requirement applies to all ships of 300 gross toimage and upwards engaged on 
international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on 
international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size. AIS were developed to 
deliver digital information conveying a vessel’s position, identity and other related 
information automatically from ship to ship and from ship to shore.
The systems allow ships and coastal authorities to "see" the position of other ships, even 
in situations where physical obstructions would prevent radar detection. AIS also enable 
ships to identify other ships.
Amendments to SOLAS chapter XI
The ISWG agreed in principle to amend SOLAS chapter XI to include special measures 
for maritime security and to amend the title accordingly. The general idea for 
consideration by MSC 75 is to incorporate new regulations XI/5 to 7 containing 
definitions, requirements for ships and requirements for port facilities respectively, 
supported by a draft International Code for the Security of Ships and Port Facilities, 
which should have a mandatory section.
The date for entry into force of the new regulations and the mandatory part of the 
proposed international security Code would be decided by the Diplomatic Conference on 
Maritime Security.
SOLAS Chapter XI on Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety was adopted in 
1994 and entered into force on 1 January 1996. Its current four regulations cover
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Authorization of recognized organizations, enhanced surveys, ship identification number 
and port State control on operational requirements.
Proposed new requirements for ship security plans. Ship Security Officer and 
Company Security Officer
The ISWG agreed in principle that the proposed international security Code would 
require all ships of 500 gross tonnage and above engaged in international voyages to 
carry ship security plans (SSPs). The need for such plans to be ultimately incorporated in 
the International Safety Management (ISM) Code was also acknowledged. It was 
considered essential that the mandatory requirements relating to such plans should be 
developed prior to the Diplomatic Conference on maritime security.
The Code would also include a requirement for a Ship Security Officer (SSO) and a 
Company Security Officer (CSO). The training needs of the SSO would need to be 
developed in the context of the STCW Convention and initially his/her responsibilities 
should include any necessary instruction to the crew of the ship. Training requirements 
for the SSO would need to be developed as a matter of urgency. In the case of the CSO, 
responsibilities and training requirements would be included in the Code.
Proposed new requirements for port security officer, port facility security plans and 
port yulnerability assessment
The ISWG agreed to recommend to MSC 75 to incorporate a requirement for a Port 
Security Officer (PSO) and port facility security plans (PFSP). The PFSP would address 
only the threat for the ship from ashore, the Ship Port Interface - which needed further 
identification and definition. The requirement would also need to stipulate which ports it 
would apply to. MSC will be invited to authorize more detailed work to be undertaken in 
close co-operation with ILO on comprehensive PFSP requirements.
There was concern that it may not be appropriate to require such plans for small ports. 
Port Vulnerability Assessment (PVA) was considered an essential part of the port 
facility security process and it was agreed that a new requirement for PVA would be 
incorporated in the proposed international security Code. There would also be a need to 
develop guidance/criteria for PVA based on the existing level of threat.
Ursent action on revised seafarer identification document
The ISWG agreed on the need for urgent action on a revised seafarer identification 
document.
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The Secretary-General of IMO has written to the Director- General of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), emphasizing the importance the Member States of MO 
give to revising the ILO seafarer identification document as a significant contribution to 
enhanced maritime security and requesting early action on this matter, offering the 
assistance of MO in this process.
It was hoped that the ILO Director-General would bring this matter to the attention of 
his governing body in March 2002, proposing that a new protocol to amend the ILO 
Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention of 1958 (No. 108) be developed for adoption 
by the ILO General Conference in June 2003.
The desirability of transparency of ownership and control of the ship
The ISWG discussed the issue of provision of information on the ship, its cargo and 
people and agreed that transparency of ownership and control of the ship was desirable. 
However, this could be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless the owner of a ship needed to 
be defined in future, bearing in mind that many MO instruments place responsibilities 
on the shipowner, who may, however, not be easy to identify.
The Legal Committee has been invited to comment on the ownership and control of the 
ship at its next session in April (LEG 84) and the issue should be further considered at 
MSC 75, based on the comments from LEG 84 and substantive proposals submitted.
Providins a capability for seafarers to activate an alarm in the case of a terrorist 
hiiackins
The ISWG agreed that the Sub-Committees on Radiocommunications and Search and 
Rescue (COMSAR), Ship Design and Equipment (DE) and Safety of Navigation (NAV) 
should be requested to consider means for providing a capability for seafarers to activate 
an alarm to notify authorities and other ships of a terrorist hijacking. The Sub- 
Committees will consider whether such an alarm should be surreptitious.
Inspection of containers and other carso transport units
The ISWG recommended the formalization of co-operation with the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) on the question of cargo/container inspection. The ISWG noted the 
need to ensure that the effective and efficient flow of multi-modal cargo is maintained, 
in spite of the need for cargo security. MO should work together with WCO through an 
appropriate mechanism with the aim of establishing international measures that would 
enhance the integrity of all cargo.
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In view of the annual volumes of containers being moved globally (about 150 million 
full and 40 million empty container movements in 2001), the ISWG considered this 
issue to be a particularly complex and difficult one to solve in the short term. Facilitation 
of maritime traffic needed to be balanced against the desire for maritime security.
Maritime security equipment to prevent unauthorized boardins in ports and at sea
DE 49 (meeting in March) is set to consider the issue of maritime security equipment to 
prevent unauthorized boarding in ports and at sea and report to MSC 75. The ISWG 
recognized that the kind of equipment to be used on board would largely depend again 
on risk assessment (e.g. ship types, trading areas, etc.) and that this impacted on the Ship 
Security Plan. If appropriate, a new regulation may be incorporated in the international 
security Code to require ship security equipment.
Technical Co-operation - Capacity buildins for maritime security
The ISWG noted need for technical co-operation in eombating threats to maritime 
security in terms of technology, expertise and hardware to cope with the challenges, 
should the threat become real. The assistance programme would focus on such matters 
as international or regional co-operation in form of information exchange, pooling of 
equipment and training of enforcement personnel, seafarers and port personnel.
IMO’s technical co-operation programme on maritime security, “Capacity building for 
maritime security”, has already been instigated by the Organization’s Technical Co­
operation Division, in response to Assembly resolution A.924(22).
The resolution requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures, within the 
Integrated Technical Co- operation Programme, to assist Governments to assess, put in 
place or enhance, as the case may be, appropriate infrastructure and measures to 
strengthen port safety and security to prevent and suppress terrorist acts directed against 
ports and port personnel as well as ships in port areas, passengers and crews.
The programme Capacity building for maritime security is benefiting from £1.5 million 
from the TC Fund, although the ISWG recognized that donations in cash and kind would 
be welcomed for the programme to succeed.
The programme includes the following planned activities:
Activity
1
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Expert advice to the Secretariat on security issues and preparation' of an outline 
programme for subsequent training workshops
Activity 2
Development of detailed lesson plans/ manuals based on the agreed outline programme 
Activity 3
Translation of all materials into French and Spanish 
Activity 4
Delivery of sub-regional workshops throughout the world 
Activity 5
Delivery of advisory missions/national workshops 
Activity 6
Fellowships and on-the-job training attachments
It is anticipated that, as the programme develops, it will take into account the output of 
the ISWG, MSC and other bodies and, indeed, the needs of the users of the programme. 
In the beginning, one important focus will be on “maritime domain awareness building”. 
Co-operation and support will be sought from Member States, UN and 
intergovernmental organizations both international and regional and NGO’s in 
consultative status with IMO.
In gaining experience in the implementation of the programme and from evaluating the 
uptake of advisory services and workshops, a long term TC programme and the funding 
requirement could be developed, since maritime security would continue to remain a 
significant component of IMO’s technical co-operation strategy and the programme.
The initial contributions from the TC Fund might be viewed as seed money, which 
should attract counterpart funding from bilateral and multilateral sources. Contributions 
in kind would also be sought, for example, expertise, host facilities, fellowships and on 
the job training.
Companies and individuals with the relevant maritime security experience have already 
offered their expertise to the Organization, though further help from MO Member 
States and organizations is being sought in identifying such experts.
Following the adoption by the Conference and entry into force of any maritime security 
measures in 2004, further technical co-operation will be needed to help developing
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countries to implement these new provisions and donors will be needed for such 
activities in due course.
Lons-term seals
The ISWG agreed that, as usual, the IMO Assembly and Council would be ultimately 
responsible for setting the long- term agenda for MO on issues relating to maritime 
security. The MSC, MEPC, Technical Co-operation, Facilitation and Legal Committees 
would all have roles to play, as identified in Assembly resolution A.924(22).
Amongst the medium to long term goals identified by the ISWG for further work (other 
than those mentioned above) were the following:
Review of MSC/Circ.443, issued in 1986, which includes Measures to prevent unlawful 
acts against passengers and crew on board ships, intended for application to passenger 
ships engaged on international voyages of 24 hours or more and the port facilities which 
service them. The measures should be expanded to cover all ship types.
Review of the SUA treaties - the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 
1988. This work is already being undertaken by the Legal Committee.
Review of Port Recommendations - taking into account maritime security measures.
Review of the MO/ILO/UN ECE Guidelines for Packing of Cargo Transport Units 
(CTUs). The 1997 guidelines (which replaced the MO/ILO Guidelines for Packing 
Cargo in Freight Containers or Vehicles) apply to transport by all surface and water 
modes and the whole intermodal transport chain. The guidelines are endorsed by IMO 
and ILO and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE).
Review of MO’s guidance to governments and guidance shipowners, ship operators and 
crew on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery - the latest 
guidance was issued in 1999 as Revised MSC/Circ.622 Recommendations to 
Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships and 
Revised MSC/ Circ.623 Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and 
crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships
Review of resolution A.872(20) on Guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the 
smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged 
in international maritime traffic (adopted in 1997).
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Outline of a port security instrument- - the ISWG agreed to invite MSC 75 to consider 
the need for the development of the outline of a port security instrument in co-operation 
with ILO.
Source : IMO website retrieved 8 Aug 2002: http://www.imo.org/home.asp?flash=false
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APPENDIX III
GUIDE - SUMMARY FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ON 
MARITIME GOVERNANCE
In the different chapters there are questions, concepts, conflictive or differing opinions 
and operational aspects that need further study in order to reach a clearer view of 
maritime governance in a practical and implemental way. This list is simply a summary 
and an expansion in some cases to assist as an aide to further research or as a checklist 
when exploring the subject of maritime governance. By no means is it exhaustive, it is 
only an approximation with the hope that it will be a useful instrument and aide memoire.
CHAPTER II
• Would governments provide similar measures of financial aide to shipping, as 
were the measures that were provided after the WTC attacks to US airlines?
• From which government would the ships registered in international registries be 
supported financially with the losses of terrorist attacks?
• Can international registries aide the ships of their flag in terrorist incidents? If 
not what mechanisms must be put in place?
• In matters maritime, will governments support insurance policies of ships other 
than their own flag?
• What would be the effect translated to shipping of repeated violence on the very 
elastic trade flows?
CHAPTER III
• To develop a regime towards governance legislation needs to be preventive in 
generating the governance mechanisms. The development of preventive or even 
pre-emptive legislation has to be interfaced with policy building in a plan for 
regime building.
• National and International legislation is a high priority and the harmonization 
with an overall umbrella legislation that needs to be substantive and procedural 
needs to include all affected and non-affected countries is indispensable.
• How to implement One & Two Track Diplomacies (formal and informal 
diplomacies) for reaching the broader scope of all inclusiveness.
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• By bringing its relevance towards the international identity of shipping, the need 
for the protection of maritime trade will become an interest to be defended by all 
nations. Further development is needed in how to perform this connection.
CHAPTER IV
• General Scenario research
• Seamlessness is a highly desirable quality in Global Governance that can only be 
obtained with the participation of lower levels of governance in the processes of 
higher levels. The cost of minimizing it will he compartmentalization and the 
fallback into a routine of administration. How this is performed is a necessary 
concept of success in governance implementation that requires special study.
• '’'‘Maritime governance of terrorism, ... of security ...and even of peace as the 
ulterior objective of the UN Charter.” The ulterior objectives of maritime 
governance need more detailed specification with regards to the contributions to 
the UN Charter, specially the objective of Peace.
• Does the MSR system truly represent the maritime world?
• The representation of NGOs is more than consultative in many cases as is it is an 
example of the papers that have been presented at MSC 75 by these members. 
Their representation is not fully clear formally since their informal participation 
is much more intense.
• Institutions are in full in the I&R concept, however, individuals have no presence 
but through their national government or some private institution to which they 
can associate themselves to. This concept has much more potential to than is 
apparent.
• The new ways to network I&R is the challenge of objective 2.
• How would IMO and the maritime community deal with an intensive scenario?
• How can the reality, complexity and importance of shipping reach the higher 
levels of decision of world affairs in order to provide protection and even 
development within a situation of terrorism?
• In the Tanker War the search for the protection of shipping was pursued by track 
two diplomacy; What are the difficulties for representation of shipping due to its 
multifaceted identity, the lack of response from international organizations and 
the appropriateness of the Security Council as a forum for the matter.
CHAPTER V
• The application of principles of Constitutional Law to the representativeness of 
all the interests of Maritime Governance of Terrorism with the goal of an image 
with the fidelity of real life.
• All the components need a operationalization to make them implementable and 
to deliver low level actions and measures.
• The purpose of militarization requires expansion with the connection to the 
military structure already in place.
• The IMO convention needs further expansion of its purposes and functions.
• Protection measures need to be developed as physical protection and as financial 
protection.
• Regional policy building approaches need to be searched for.
• Greater research in the Role of the Secreatary General needs to be done, 
specially with respect to the networking function within Maritime Governance 
and outside towards the UN bodies and the civil society.
• Further research needs to be done on the perspective of self-development of the 
institution under the complexity theory in parallel to the standard structure- 
change approach.
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